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ARTICLES
THE PRIVILEGES OF SURETYSHIP FOR DELEGATING
PARTIES UNDER UCC SECTION 2-210 IN LIGHT OF THE
NEW RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP
GARY L. MONSERUD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the Code)
is being revised.' The Restatement of the Law of Suretyship has
recently been approved by the American Law Institute.2 The
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; J.D.
1976, Umversity of South Dakota; LL.M. 1985, New York Umversity Law School. I
have received enormous help and encouragement in writing this Article. The Trust-
ees of New England School of Law provided a summer stipend. My colleagues, Pro-
fessor Curt Nyquist, and Visiting Professor Richard G. Huber, Dean Emeritus, Bos-
ton College of Law (visiting at New England, 1995-1996), provided constructive criti-
cism on an early draft. Brendan McDonough, my research assistant, labored long to
find old cases on suretyship. Ann Jones, my wife, sought to curb my tendency to-
ward verbosity. All R. Sharifahmadian of the William & Mary Law Review expertly
and expeditiously edited a challenging manuscript. Finally, Neil B. Cohen, Professor
of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship &
Guaranty, provided many insights on changes wrought by the new Restatement.
However, if the Article contains any doctrinal error, it is mine alone.
1. The Drafting Committee is working under the auspices of the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Professor Richard E. Speidel, Northwestern Umversity School of Law, is the Report-
er. Professor Raymond T. Nimmer, Umversity of Houston Law Center, is the Re-
porter for technology issues. The drafts circulated to date have been for discussion
purposes only. All excerpts from revised Article 2 in this Article are copyright 1996
.by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and are reprinted with permission of the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. (1995). The Restatement of
Suretyship was approved by the membership of the American Law Institute in 1995.
The Reporter was Professor Neil B. Cohen, Brooklyn Law School. All excerpts from
the Restatement contained in this Article are copyright 1995 by the American Law
Institute and are reprinted with permission of the American Law Institute.
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time is right to examine the application of suretyship principles
to transactions covered by Article 2. One intersection of surety-
ship and Article 2 occurs when suretyship principles are applied
to a delegation of obligations arising under a contract governed
by Article 2. In such a delegation, the privileges of suretyship
are conferred upon the delegating party by operation of law
The UCC section most relevant to the delegation of obligations
governed by Article 2 is section 2-210, which recognizes assign-
ments and delegations as "normal and permissible incidents of a
contract for the sale of goods."' Section 2-210 does not mention
suretyship, but, under section 1-103, unless displaced by the
Code, "principles of law and equity shall supplement its
provisions." Through section 1-103, suretyship principles can
flow into legal relationships created by delegations governed by
Article 2.
In its simplest sense, "suretyship" refers to a legal relation-
ship "whereby one person engages to be answerable for the debt
or default of another."5 The definition implies tripartite relation-
3. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 1 (1994). See UCC § 2-210(1), which states:
A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise
agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having his
original promisor perform or control the acts required by the contract. No
delegation of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to
perform or any liability for breach.
Id. § 2-210(1). Comment 1 to § 2-210 states: "Generally, this section recognizes both
delegation of performance and assignability as normal and permssible incidents of a
contract for the sale of goods." Id. § 2-210 cmt. 1. Neither the statute's text nor the
comment mentions suretyship.
4. Id. § 1-103. Section 1-103 states in its entirety: "Unless displaced by the par-
ticular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Id.
5. ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 1.1 (James L. Elder ed., 5th
ed. 1951). Stearns's complete definition is: "Suretyship may be defined as a contrac-
tual relation whereby one person engages to be answerable for the debt or default of
another." Id. The text makes a substitution for the words 'contractual relation" be-
cause the sureties discussed in this Article do not voluntarily assume a suretyship
status; hence, the general definition seems too narrow. Section 82 of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Security defines suretyship in the following manner: "Suretyship
is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and
another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is enti-
tled to but one performance, and as between the two who are bound, one rather
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ships-suretyship requires a principal obligor, a creditor, and a
surety 6 The suretyship arising in the course of a delegation
governed by section 2-210 is referred to as "nonconsensual"7 or
"involuntary"' suretyship or "suretyship by operation of law "9
The term "nonconsensual" will be used most often in this Article,
although the other terms also will appear from time to time as
functional equivalents. Nonconsensual suretyship is a status
arising from any delegation of an obligation of any nature with-
out a novation. 0 The term "nonconsensual suretyship," as used
than the other should perform." RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 82 (1941). The latter is
more exacting than the definition given by Stearns but also is harder to digest. In
his treatise, Professor Simpson states:
A surety, in the broad sense, is one who is liable for the debt or
obligation of another, whether primarily or secondarily, conditionally or
unconditionally. In other words, the term surety includes anyone who is
bound on an obligation which, as between himself and another person
who is bound to the obligee for the same performance, the latter obligor
should discharge.
LAWRENCE P SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAv OF SURETYSHIP § 4 (1950).
6. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 82 cints. a-d. Comment a notes the tripartite na-
ture of suretyship relationships. Id. cmt. a. Comment b defines a "surety" as "the
person who is bound on an obligation from which another, by the discharge of a
duty, should relieve him." Id. cmt. b. Comment c defines a principal as "the person
who, in the solution of the rights and duties of the parties, should bear the ultimate
burden unless excused for some reason personal to himself." Id. cmt. c. Comment d
defines a creditor as "the person to whom the surety is bound and to whom the
principal is under an obligation or other duty." Id. cmt. d.
7. The term "nonconsensual," in relation to suretyship through delegation, is not
in common use. The term is borrowed from an article by Professor Campbell. See
Morton C. Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69 (1935). Professor
Campbell used the term "nonconsensual suretyship" to describe situations in which a
person voluntarily consents to assume the obligations of a surety without the con-
sent of one or more of the parties to the transaction. As described in the text, the
term has a different meaning in this Article. See infra note 11 (discussing
nonconsensual suretyship).
8. For a definition of the term "involuntary," as used to describe suretyship sta-
tus attained through delegation, see STEARNS, supra note 5, § 2.3.
9. E.g., 74 AM. JUR. 2D Suretyship § 8 (1974).
10. Farnsworth defines "novation" as follows:
The term novation is used to describe a substituted contract that
discharges a duty by adding a party who was neither the obligor nor the
obligee of that duty. The party added may be an obligor, as when a
creditor takes a third party's promise to pay in satisfaction of the debt.
Since the promise is that of a third party, it differs from the existing
duty and is consideration for the discharge of that duty, even if the
promised performance is only part of that owed by the original debtor.
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in this Article, thus does not include situations in winch a per-
son voluntarily assumes the obligations of a surety without the
principal's consent, even though such usage can be justified by
the Restatement of Security n
As an illustration of nonconsensual suretyship, consider the
following hypothetical situation. Ella, an old lawyer, sells Portia,
a young lawyer, a collection of law books for $12,000, to be paid
at $500 per month over twenty-four months.12 Ella delivers the
books. After one year (and twelve $500 payments) Portia leaves
law for politics. She sells the books to Sonya, who agrees to pay
$6000 cash and to assume Portia's remaimng obligation to Ella.
When Portia delivers the books, she notifies Ella of the sale and
of Sonya's assumption of her outstanding $6000 debt. In this
situation, the law impresses suretyship status upon Portia. The
sale to Sonya caused Sonya to become a principal obligor, Portia
to become a surety, and Ella to become a creditor or obligee.13
These imposed suretyship relationships significantly alter the
The party added may instead be an obligee, as when the original creditor
takes the debtor's promise to pay a third party in satisfaction of the
debt.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.24, at 301 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omit-
ted). For a discussion of "assignment" and "delegation" and related terms, see
infra part IV
11. The Restatement of Security recognizes that "Itihe surety may have undertak-
en his obligation as a result of direct dealings with the creditor without the consent
of the principal or even without his knowledge." RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 82 cmt. f
(1941). This situation is sometimes referred to as "nonconsensual suretyship." See,
e.g., Campbell, supra note 7, at 69. Professor Neil Cohen also recognizes that the
term "nonconsensual suretyship" can be used in this way. See RESTATEMENT OF
SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 1 reporter's note, cmt. m (1995). Such a surety's rights to
reimbursement and exoneration were considered separately in the Restatement of
Security. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 104(2) & illus. 4 (reimbursement); 1d. § 112
cmt. f (exoneration). Thus, there has been some use of the term "nonconsensual
suretyship" to designate a status different from suretyship through delegation. This
Article does not hesitate to use the term with a new meaning because the combina-
tion of the words "nonconsensual" and "suretyship" seem to capture the sense of the
situation this Article discusses, and any older meanings seem not to have gamed
widespread usage.
12. The hypothetical situation assumes that there is no interest owed on the out-
standing debt and that Ella did not reserve title, which would complicate matters by
creating an Article 9 security interest. See U.C.C. § 2-401(i) (1994).
13. RESTATEMENT OF SEC., § 82 cmts. a-d. Sometimes the creditor is referred to as
the "obligee."
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rights and obligations of the parties in ways that cannot be
understood solely by attending to the text of Article 2.'4
The potential influx of suretyship law into delegations of obli-
gations arising under Article 2 contracts seems seldom noticed
in case law 5 or treatises. 6 Nonetheless, one can easily con-
struct illustrations blending delegation and suretyship law 7 In
cases in which Article 2 has not been recogmzed as controlling, a
few appellate courts have woven together strands of suretyship
law and delegation, albeit somewhat unevenly 18
The paucity of such explicatory material led to this Article,
Jthe objective of which is twofold. First, the Article will demon-
strate the inextricable entwinement of Article 2 delegations and
suretyship principles. Second, it will explore the ways in which
the new Restatement of Suretyship will change the results of
applying suretyship law to Article 2 delegations from what those
results would have been under either the common law9 or the
1941 Restatement of Security 20 This Article is thus descriptive
14. For example, a time extension that Ella and Sonya nnght agree on without
Portia's consent likely would discharge Portia. If Ella and Sonya agreed on interest
without Portia's consent, there having been no interest under the original agreement,
Portia would be discharged. Moreover, if Ella decided to release Sonya for less than
full payment with the intention of looking to Portia for payment under the original
agreement, Portia probably would be released. These conclusions assume the applica-
bility of the 1941 Restatement of Security. The results of nonconsensual suretyship
status are explored in greater detail in Parts II-VI of this Article.
15. Delegation cases citing UCC § 2-210 are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
To date, the only case in which an appellate court has cited § 2-210 in conjunction
with a discussion of nonconsensual suretyship has been Rosenberg v. Son, Inc., 491
N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1992).
16. E.g., RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed. 1995); WIL-
LIAM H. HENNING & GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1992); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed. 1995). White and Summers cite § 2-210 only three
times, each time in a footnote. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, § 3-10 nn.2, 11 (men-
tioning § 2-210 in connection with a discussion about the protection of third parties);
id. § 19-9 n.5 (mentiomng only the applicability of assignment and delegation law to
letters of credit). Hennig and Wallach do not cite § 2-210. Anderson devotes more
than forty pages to § 2-210 but makes no mention of suretyship principles as bear-
ing on delegation.
17. For illustrations blending delegation and suretyslp law, see infra part IV
18. For a discussion of cases involving delegation and suretyship law, see infra
parts III-IV
19. See infra part II.
20. See -infra part III.
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rather than prescriptive, except for a modest proposal that a
revised Article 2 should explicitly recognize the importance of
nonconsensual suretyship.
This Article is organized along the following plan. Part II
discusses nonconsensual suretyship at common law Part III
examines nonconsensual suretyship under the 1941 Restatement
of Security Part IV blends selected delegation cases citing UCC
section 2-210 with suretyship principles drawn from the 1941
Restatement of Security Part V discusses several changes made
in the new Restatement of Suretyship as they bear on
nonconsensual sureties. Part VI uses three hypotheticals to com-
pare the differences that result from applying the new Restate-
ment of Suretyship rather than the 1941 Restatement of Securi-
ty Finally, Part VII discusses case law evidencing a recent trend
toward expanding the scope of-Article 2, an expansion that will
make the blend of suretyship and delegation more important
than it was in the early years of the Code.
II. NONCONSENSUAL SURETYSHIP AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Rights of Nonconsensual Sureties in Real Estate Sales
Nonconsensual suretyship antedates attempts to systematize
the privileges attached to it. The oldest reported cases arose
from sales of real estate.2' One example is Unin Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hanford,22 decided by the Supreme Court in
1892. Chase and Hanford had mortgaged land to Schureman as
security for payment of three promissory notes on which they
were signatories.' They paid the first note. Before the second
and third notes were due, however, Schureman sold the notes,
21. Examples of cases recognizing the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship when
a mortgagor transfers real property to a mortgagee and the latter assumes the mort-
gage include: Seale v. Berryman, 49 P.2d 997 (Ariz. 1935); Wilcox v. Campbell, 12
N.E. 823 (N.Y. 1887); Walser v. Farmers' Trust Co., 185 N.E. 535 (Ohio 1933);
Hurst v. Merrifield, 23 P.2d 124 (Or. 1933); Zastrow v. Knight, 229 N.W. 925 (S.D.
1930). Hurst and Zastrow contain many citations to further authorities.
22. 143 U.S. 187 (1892).
23. Id. at 187. The three notes were as follows: the first was for $5000 due in
one year at eight percent annual interest; the second was for $5000 due m two
years at eight percent annual interest; and the third was for $6000 due in three
years at 10% annual interest. Id.
1312
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along with the mortgage, to Union Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany (Union Mutual).' 4 Meanwhile, Chase and Hanford sold
the mortgaged land to Fake, who assumed their obligations
under the notes secured by the mortgage.' Chase advised Un-
ion Mutual of the sale and further advised that Fake would be
making payments on the notes. 6 Unbeknownst to Chase or
Hanford, however, Fake negotiated a binding agreement with
Union Mutual to extend the due dates on both notes." Subse-
quently, Fake defaulted.' Union Mutual foreclosed on the
mortgaged property, which it sold for $12,000-not enough to
cover the balance owed on the notes.29 As a result, Union Mutu-
al sued Chase and Hanford for the deficiency 3 o
The trial court denied recovery 1 The United States Supreme
Court upheld the result based on suretyship principles3 2 The
grantee (Fake), by assumption of the debt secured by the mort-
gage, became primarily liable on the notes for which the mort-
gage was security The grantors, Chase and Hanford, thereby at-
tained the privileges of suretyship. As soon as the mortgagee
(Union Mutual) knew of this transaction, it was bound to respect
the rights of its nonconsensual sureties, Chase and Hanford."
According to the Court:
24. Id. at 188. The case report states that, in all relevant events, Umon Mutual
Life Insurance Co. acted through Boone, its authorized agent. In the recapitulation
in the text, Boone's acts are all simply narrated as acts of his principal.
25. Id. The actual purchaser was Mrs. Fake, but her husband, as her agent,
thereafter negotiated an extension. 'Fake" herein refers to both the husband and the
wife, even though the wife was the owner of record.
26. Though not essential to the legal analysis, Umon Mutual, through its agent
Boone, acknowledged the assumption. Id.
27. Id. Fake made the agreement to extend the time for payment binding by
paying $340 for the change. This fact was important because time extensions as a
matter of grace were msufficient to justify discharge of the obligation; rather, the
binding contractual modification was the justification for discharge.
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id. The sale was executed by the master, presumably on order of the circuit
court. Id. at 188.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The trial court applied Illinois law. Choice of law was not an issue on appeal.
The Supreme Court cited numerous cases from many jurisdictions that sustained its
view of suretyship principles as prmcAples of general application. Id. at 191.
33. Id.
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[T]he consequence must follow that any subsequent agree-
ment of the mortgagee with the grantee, without the assent
of the grantor, extending the time of payment of the mort-
gage debt, discharges the grantor from all personal liability
for that debt. 4
Hanford and Chase, therefore, were wholly discharged when
Fake negotiated the binding extension agreement with Union
Mutual without their consent. In the Supreme Court's opinion,
this case turned on settled principles of law-
The case is thus brought within the well settled and famil-
iar rule that if a creditor, by positive contract with the princi-
pal debtor, and without the consent of the surety, extends the
time of payment by the principal debtor, he thereby discharg-
es the surety; because the creditor, by so giving time to the
principal, puts it out of the power of the surety to consider
whether he will have recourse to his remedy against the
principal, and because the surety cannot have the same rem-
edy against the principal as he would have had under the
original contract; and it is for the surety alone to judge
whether his position is altered for the worse."
Unpacking this dense language in light of the facts, it be-
comes apparent that: Fake became the principal debtor upon his
assumption of the debt secured by the mortgage; Hanford and
Chase became nonconsensual sureties; and, in the language of
suretyship, the mortgagee's assignee (Union Mutual) was the
creditor. As nonconsensual sureties, Chase and Hanford had
rights of subrogation and reimbursement if Fake defaulted and
they paid the notes. 6 These rights could not arse until after
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Stearns discusses the surety's right to reimbursement:
The third great equitable right of a surety is his right, on payment
of the principal's debt, to be indemnified by the principal for the loss
sustained by the surety in malng payment of the debt. This right, some-
times also described as a right to reimbursement or exoneration, is um-
versally recognized.
STEARNS, supra note 5, § 11.35; see SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 48. The surety's right
to reimbursement depends on payment to the creditor of a debt owed. One also
1314
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the due date on the notes because they were contingent on the
sureties being liable to, and paying, the creditor. By negotiating
an extension of the due dates, Fake necessarily extended the
time in which Hanford and Chase could pay the notes and seek
reimbursement from Fake or assert any rights by subrogation
against Fake." The extension could have prejudiced their
rights. For example, if Fake's financial situation had deterorat-
ed between the original due dates and the later due dates, the
chances of collecting reimbursement would have been diin-
ished. This possibility of prejudice, according to the Court, was
enough to justify discharge. Actual provable prejudice was not
the question. Rather, the Court stated that "it is for the surety
alone to judge whether his position is altered for the worse."38
By virtue of their suretyship status, which was impressed upon
them by law, Hanford and Chase received a complete discharge
upon proof of the unconsented-to alteration of the contract by
the binding agreement between their grantee and their creditor.
The result of Unon Mutual is consistent with the ancient rule
of stnctissirnz juris.Y When Unon Mutual was decided, well-
established principles of law strictly held a surety to the
principal's obligation as it existed when suretyship status was
attained. An agreement to extend the time of payment without
the surety's consent operated as an automatic and immediate
discharge.4 9 A single day's change without the surety's consent
should note that Hanford and Chase would have been subrogated to Union Mutual's
rights to the mortgaged property had they paid off the notes before foreclosure and
sale. Stearns states, in relevant part:
Subrogation in suretysip is "a mode which equity adopts to compel
the ultimate discharge of the debt by him who in good conscience ought
to pay it, and to relieve him whom none but the creditor could ask to
pay." The scope of the right of subrogation consists in the immediate
transfer, by operation of law, to the promisor in suretyslp of all the
rights of the creditor against the principal whenever the promisor pays
the debt or satisfies the obligation.
STEARNS, supra note 5, § 11.1 (footnotes omitted); see 4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1206 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941);
SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 47.
37. Hanford, 143 U.S. at 188.
38. Id. at 191.
39. "Strictissimi jurts" means "[of the strictest right or law." BLAcK'S LAW DIcTIO-
NARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
40. See ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 81 (Clinton Dewitt ed.,
13151996]
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caused discharge in toto, unless there was a waiver or a reser-
vation of rights."
It bears repeating that, in property transfers, as in the Unin
Mutual case, suretyship status is not sought or bargained for.
Chase and Hanford may not have been aware of their suretyship
status until litigation commenced. Their knowledge of their
status was irrelevant to ascertaimng their rights; they attained
their privileged status, wittingly or unwittingly, when Fake
assumed their debt. The assumption of the debt secured by the
mortgage and the disclosure of this fact to the creditor triggered
events by which the law bestowed on them the privileges of
nonconsensual suretyship. 2
2d ed. 1915). In a later edition, Stearns articulated the reasons for the discharge as
follows:
There are three reasons usually given for this rule of discharge: (1) the
giving of time operates to substitute a new contract for the old, to which
new contract the surety is not a party; (2) the extension impairs the
surety's right of subrogation, i.e., his right to bring a suit in the
creditor's name to obtain reimbursement from the principal; and (3) the
agreement to extend time of payment or performance increases the risk
of the surety, who had considered the principal's probability of payment
or performance on the due date but had not calculated the principal's
responsibility beyond that date.
STEARNS, supra note 5, § 6.16.
41. The peculiar doctrine known as "reservation of rights" allows a creditor to
accommodate a principal's request for a time extension without ipso facto discharging
the surety, even though the surety may not agree to or even be aware of the ex-
tension and reservation. Regarding the reservation-of-rights doctrine, Stearns states:
An extension of time granted to the principal does not discharge the
surety where the creditor expressly reserves his rights against the surety.
Such a reservation qualifies the extension of time in that, although the
creditor has bound himself not to proceed against the debtor until the
maturity of the extension, he has not changed his relations with the
surety, since he has specifically reserved his right to sue him at once.
This reservation of rights against the surety being a condition of the
contract for extension entered into with the debtor, the latter impliedly
assents that the surety may have all his original rights preserved against
him as principal debtor. Although the creditor must forbear suit against
the principal, yet the surety, if he pays the debt, may sue the principal
at once. Accordingly, there is said to be no alteration of the surety's
contract and no equitable reason for urging his discharge.
STEARNS, supra note 5, § 6.34 (footnotes omitted); see Gholson v. Savm, 31 N.E.2d
858 (Ohio 1941); SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 73, at 362-63; J.W Oler, Annotation,
Creditor's Reservation of Rights Against Surety in Releasing or Extending Time to
Principal Debtor, 139 A.L.R. 85 (1942).
42. See H.D.W., Annotation, Release of Mortgagor (or Intermediate Grantee Who
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B. The Rights of Nonconsensual Sureties in Sales of Goods
In the mneteenth and early twentieth century, the principles
pertaimng to nonconsensual suretyship, illustrated in Unin
Mutual, were applied mainly to real estate cases.4 3 Occasional-
ly, courts applied these principles to sales of goods, specifically
when goods (inventory or equipment) were sold as part of a
going concern. One example is Malanaphy v. Fuller & Johnson
Manufacturing Co.,4' decided by the Iowa Supreme Court in
1904. In Malanaphy, the court sustained a lower court's decree
that prevented execution against sellers who had become sure-
ties by operation of law and had a claim for discharge in toto be-
cause of dealings between their creditor and their buyers, who
had assumed payment obligations to their creditor.45
Malanaphy & Daly was a partnership that sold farm imple-
ments in Decorah, Iowa.4" In 1889, the partners owed Fuller &
Johnson Manufacturing Co. (Fuller & Johnson) $179 for mer-
chandise acquired on credit.4 ' The partners had signed a prom-
Has Assumed the Mortgage) by Subsequent Dealings Between His Grantee and Mort-
gagee, 112 A.L.R. 1324 (1938).
43. The law of involuntary or nonconsensual suretyslup in real estate sales has
been covered in many treatises. See HERSCHEL W. ARANT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SURETYSHIP AND GuARANTY § 79 (1931); GEORGE W. BRANDT, THE LAW OF SURE-
TYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 37 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 2d ed. 1891); SIMPSON, supra
note 5, § 47; STEARNS, supra note 5, § 2.3. Each treatise cites real estate cases
involving nonconsensual suretyshup.
Illustrative cases are: Hamlen v. Rednalloh Co., 197 N.E. 149 (Mass. 1935);
Zastrow v. Knight, 229 N.W. 925 (S.D. 1930). Many cases are also cited in American
Law Reports annotations. See, e.g., G.V.I., Annotation, Lessee 'As Surety for Rent
After Assignment; and Effect of Lessors Dealings (Other Than Consent to Assignment
or Mere Acceptance of Rent From Assignee) to Release Lessee, 99 A.L.R. 1238 (1935);
R.E.H., Annotation, Release of Mortgagor (or Intermediate Grantee Who Has Assumed
the Mortgage) by Subsequent Dealings Between His Grantee and the Mortgagee, 72
A.L.R. 389 (1931).
For law review articles, see Note, A Mortgagor As Surety for His Assignee, 15
HARv. L. REv. 398 (1901-1902). A more recent discussion is found in B. Benjamin
Beard, Suretyship on the Fringe: Suretyship by Operation *of Law and by Analogy, 34
Wu. & MARY L. REV. 1157, 1165 & nn.27-28 (1993) (citing several cases involving
nonconsensual suretyship arismg from real property transfers). Professor Beard's
article has been an invaluable source for this Article.
44. 101 N.W 640 (Iowa 1904).
45. Id. at 642.
46. Id. at 640.
47. Id.
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issory note for this amount.4" Malanaphy & Daly sold the im-
plement business, including the stock in trade, to Christen and
Gilbertson, who agreed to assume the note payable to Fuller &
Johnson.49 As in Union Mutual, the buyers acquiring title to
the property assumed a debt in connection with the purchase,
and the assumption was part of the purchase price.
Malanaphy & Daly asked Fuller & Johnson to approve the
substitution of Christen and Gilbertson as debtors.50 This
would have effected a novation. Fuller & Johnson declined the
request."' Nonetheless, Malanaphy, Daly, Christen, and
Gilbertson-all four-signed a new promissory note and sent
this note to Fuller & Johnson, which, under the circumstances,
was sufficient to advise Fuller & Johnson (the creditor) that
Christen and Gilbertson had become the primary obligors on the
debt for the farm implements. 2
Christen & Gilbertson, now a partnership operating in the
implement business, obtained more goods from Fuller & Johnson
on credit."3 Christen & Gilbertson eventually fell upon hard
times, failing to pay an account for goods received and default-
ing on the note that they had signed for the debt originally in-
curred by Malanaphy & Daly 4 Fuller & Johnson obtained a
judgment for the account payable for goods received after the
purchase of the business and, thereafter, sued all four signa-
tones on the note given for the debt assumed when the business
was sold.5 On this latter debt, Fuller & Johnson obtained a de-
fault judgment against Christen, Malanaphy, and Daly and then
negotiated a settlement with Christen."5 Christen paid $200,
and in return for the $200, Fuller & Johnson released him from
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Had Fuller & Johnson agreed to the request, it would have extinguished
any liability of Malanaphy & Daly, which was probably the purpose of the request.
52. The court noted that Christen & Gilbertson signed first, id., perhaps indicating
by position their status as principals. In any event, Fuller & Johnson had enough
information to be on notice of the arrangement.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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any and all liability on the note judgment." This proved to be a
major mistake for Fuller & Johnson, who intended to pursue
Malanaphy and Daly for the uncollected balance.
Fuller & Johnson settled with Christen without Malanaphy's
or Daly's knowledge or acquiescence." As a result, when Fuller
& Johnson sought to enforce the judgment against them,
Malanaphy and Daly brought suit to restrain enforcement. 9
The trial court restrained enforcement," and the Iowa Supreme
Court upheld the decree on the ground that Malanaphy and
Daly were completely discharged when the creditors-Fuller &
Johnson-released Christen in exchange for consideration.6
The court based the result on suretyship principles.
The court explained its rationale as follows:
Turning our attention to the principal parties to the contract,
it is quite clear that [Christen & Gilbertson] became pri-
marily liable for the debt. It assumed the relation of a princi-
pal, and, as to it, the obligation of [Malanaphy and Daly] be-
came that of a surety only
.[T]he receipt and acceptance of the note had the effect
to further apprise [Fuller & Johnson] of the relation existing
between the two firms, and of its obligation to respect the
same.
Accepting of the situation as we find it, our conclusion is
that the release of Christen operated to release his principals,
Malanaphy and Daly, who, as to him, and with knowledge on
the part of [Fuller & Johnson], were secondarily bound only
for the payment of the judgment.62
As in Unin Mutual, the buyers who assumed a debt for the
sellers became principal obligors. The sellers remained liable to
the creditor but were accorded suretyship status. When the
creditor was apprised of the facts giving rise to nonconsensual
suretyship, the creditor became legally obligated to respect that
relationship. Respecting the relationship meant making no deals
57. Id.
58. Id. at 641.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
1996] 1319
1320 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1307
with the principal obligors without each surety's consent or, in
the case of time extensions, a reservation of rights.' When
Fuller & Johnson (the creditor) released Christen (a principal
obligor), the sureties' obligations (accessory by nature) were
extinguished.'
To have held the sureties liable when their rights of reim-
bursement and subrogation had been compromised would have
been unfair. 5 That the persons involved may not have known
of their suretyship status until after the fact was of no conse-
quence because the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship did
not arise from the parties' intent. Rather, the privileges of sure-
tyship attached when the sale and assumption of the debt oc-
curred and the creditor was advised of the debt assumption. The
status of nonconsensual suretyship thus was important at com-
mon law in cases arising from sales of goods as well as from
sales of real estate.6
Applying the rules discerned in the foregoing cases to the
hypothetical in the introduction requires little imagination.
According to the holding of Unin Mutual, if Sonya made a deal
with Ella to extend her time for payment of the $6000 obligation
assumed from Portia and neither got Portia's consent nor made
63. For a discussion of reservation of rights, see supra note 41.
64. See STEARNS, supra note 5, § 6.42. Stearns states:
[I]f the principal has been released by the creditor, the surety will be
discharged also. This follows from the elementary proposition of surety-
ship that the surety's obligation is accessory to the main obligation and
can have no force when the main obligation has been performed. Further-
more, the release of the principal eliminates the surety's right to be
indemnified or reimbursed by the principal and, for that reason, it would
be manifestly unjust to require the surety to pay the debt after the prin-
cipal has been discharged.
Id. (footnote omitted); see SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 63.
65. See STEARNS, supra note 5, § 6.42.
66. Cases involving sales of goods in which nonconsensual suretyship is discussed
in any manner admittedly are rare. Generally, such cases involve the sale of chat-
tels as a part of a business. In addition to Malanaphy, see McKey-Fansher Co. v.
Rowen, 5 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1942) (involving sale of a beauty parlor and barber
shop); Harvey's Rubber & Supply Co. v. Kilbane, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 297 (Ohio Ct. App.
1930) (involving sale of a business). For a discussion of more recent cases involving
sales of goods and nonconsensual suretyship, see infra part IV, in which the applica-
bility of the Restatement of Security is explained. Nonconsensual suretyship has also
turned up in stock sales. E.g., Sauder v. Dittmar, 118 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1941).
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a reservation of rights, the extension would discharge Portia's
surety obligation. According to the holding of Malanaphy, if Ella
agreed to discharge Sonya for less than full payment, intending
to hold Portia liable for the balance, the agreement would dis-
charge Portia's surety obligation. The law of delegation is incom-
plete without considering the influx of suretyship principles as
they apply to all of the parties to the transaction.
C. The Extension of Nonconsensual Suretyship from Real Estate
to Sales of Goods and Beyond: Perspectwe Through a Survey Qf
the Treatises
Providing a history of nonconsensual suretyship is not the
objective of this Article. An examination of the historical back-
ground will, however, be helpful to provide an overview of devel-
opments by which suretyship and delegation became intertwined
in scholarly thinking. Scholars, starting at the end of the 1800s,
incorporated nonconsensual suretyship into their doctrinal sys-
tems of suretyship law and contract law An overview of
nonconsensual suretyship as it evolved in the twentieth century
thus can easily be garnered by a brief survey of the major trea-
tises, which should make the Restatements that followed more
comprehensible.
George W Brandt's classic work, The Law of Suretyship and
Guaranty, demonstrates an early recognition of nonconsensual
suretyship." Brandt discussed nonconsensual suretyship only in
the context of real estate sales and gave the following example:
If a party owmng land, incumbered by mortgage to secure his
debt, sells it, and the vendee, as part of the purchase price,
agrees to pay the mortgage debt, the vendor, as between
themselves at least, becomes the surety of the vendee for the
mortgage debt, and the vendee becomes the principal, and
the vendor will, as to such debt, be entitled to the same
rights and remedies against the vendee that any surety has
against his principal. Whether the vendor in such case would
be entitled to all the rights of a surety as against the
creditor, who had knowledge of the facts, is not quite so clear
67. BRANDT, supra note 43.
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upon authority 6 8
In this embryonic stage, the law of nonconsensual suretyship
was clear as between the principal and surety (vendor and vend-
ee)-apparently, the nonconsensual surety had rights of reim-
bursement and subrogation. The risks imposed upon the credi-
tor, however, which were so well illustrated in Malanaphy and
Union Mutual, had not yet been clarified. Because the vendor's
rights as a surety were granted by law and not by consent of the
parties, it is appropriate to describe this kind of suretyship as
nonconsensual. Brandt, however, recognized nonconsensual
suretyship exclusively in connection with real estate transfers.
Later treatises recognized that the creditor was indeed affect-
ed by the status of nonconsensual suretyship69 and extended
the legally imposed privileges that the status implied to transac-
tions other than real estate sales. The foremost example is Ar-
thur Stearns's The Law of Suretyship.0 The following summa-
tion from the 1915 edition captures the growth of the law-
An obligation in suretyship will not be implied, and never
arises by act of the parties except by express contract. Yet
the law will sometimes place persons in the situation of a
Surety or Guarantor, not by imposing the liabilities of these
undertakings without their assent, but by extending to per-
sons already bound upon some other contract, the privileges
of these relations. Thus, where a partnership is dissolved, one
partner assuming the debts or taking the assets or continu-
ing the business, the retiring partner is placed in the situa-
tion of a Surety for the partnership debts, and can claim the
privileges of that relation as against the creditors of the firm
who have notice of this arrangement. While this obligation to
treat another as a promisor in suretyship is imposed upon
the creditor without his assent, yet it is founded upon the
highest equity, and is an enforcement of a principle of good
faith in commercial transactions. Also the vendor of land
68. Id. § 37 (footnote omitted).
69. This recognition was not necessarily found in later cases. See, e.g., Rosenberg
v. Son, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1992), discussed infra part IV.B. In Rosenberg, the
court found a delegating party to be a surety, but only in relation to the delegate,
not in relation to the creditor. See infra part IV.B.
70. STEARNS, supra note 40, § 23.
1322
19961 PRIVILEGES OF SURETYSHIP 1323
subject to a mortgage, which the vendee agrees to pay, occu-
pies the same relation to the mortgagee, and may insist that
the rights of a surety be observed as to him.7
Three things are noteworthy in this excerpt. First, creditors
having notice of nonconsensual suretyship status were obliged to
respect the status or suffer the consequences. Stearns left no
doubt about the delegate's suretyship status in relation to credi-
tors, as had Brandt. Second, the equitable nature of the imposed
arrangement was explicit. Stearns recognized the law of
nonconsensual suretyship as an attempt to play fairly with a
delegating party, whether that party be a seller or a withdraw-
ing partner. Third, the law of nonconsensual suretyship, as
discussed by Stearns, was not confined to real estate sales; rath-
er, real estate sales were simply one concrete situation illustrat-
ing a delegation in which suretyship principles were deemed
applicable.
Herschel Arant's treatise,72 published in 1931, also recog-
nized the applicability of nonconsensual suretyship law to situa-
tions other than real estate transactions, particularly withdraw-
als from partnerships.73 This broader applicability also was rec-
ognized generally in secondary authorities.74 The stage thus
71. Id.
72. ARANT, supra note 43, § 79.
73. Arant stated:
A mortgagor who sells the property mortgaged to a grantee, who as-
sumes payment of the mortgage debt, becomes a surety, and is entitled
to the security of the mortgage if he pays. The same is true of a retiring
partner to whom the remaining partners promise that they will pay the
partnership indebtedness.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. The following statement is an example of those authorities:
A common instance of involuntary suretyship, at least as between
the principal and surety themselves, occurs where one party to a con-
tract, as a part of the agreement, assumes an indebtedness owing by the
other to a third person, the one assuming the indebtedness becoming the
principal, and the former debtor a surety. For example, where a purchas-
er of mortgaged land assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage debt, he
becomes the principal debtor, and the mortgagor or grantor occupies the
position of a surety; or where, upon the dissolution of a firm or a change
in the membership, the continuing partners or new firm assumes the
firm debts, those who assume the debts are, as among themselves, the
principal debtor and the retiring partners are regarded as sureties.
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was set for the Restatement of Security, published in 1941."5
The 1951 edition of Stearns's treatise76 recognized several com-
mon situations, including sales of mortgaged chattels, as
grounds for imposing nonconsensual suretyship. The treatise
stated in relevant part:
Whenever a party promises another to pay Ins debt or
perform his obligation to a third person, as between promisor
and promisee, the former becomes the principal obligor and
the latter acquires the privileges of a surety
The transactions winch may give rise to a suretysinp by
operation of law are vaned. Thus, where a partnersinp is
dissolved and a continuing partner assumes the firm's debts,
or a partner pledges ins individual property to secure a firm
debt, or an assignee of a lease covenants to pay the rent, or a
purchaser of mortgaged personalty or realty assumes payment
of the mortgage a relation m the nature of suretyship is
considered to have arisen.7
The reference to mortgaged personalty is significant, and this
recognition of nonconsensual suretyship in sales of goods spread
to contract treatises. Professor Corbin, in his famous treatise on
contract law, briefly touched upon nonconsensual suretyship in
the course of discussing assignment and delegation.78 He
stressed that a delegating party is not relieved of an obligation
by a mere delegation, but he acknowledged that such a party
"occupies substantially the position of surety ,79 His treatment
of the subject explicitly included delegations in sales-of-goods
contracts as well as contracts for the sale of real estate.
Professor Corbin used the following illustration:
The buyer can assign Ins right to the goods or land and can
delegate performance of Ins duty to pay the price. He himself
remains bound as before by Ins duty to pay that price. But
observe that he remains bound "as before"; the assignee and
50 C.J. Prznczpal and Surety § 34 (1936).
75. See infra part III.
76. STEARNS, supra note 5.
77. Id. § 2.3 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
78. 4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 866, at 458-59 (1951).
79. Id. § 866, at 459.
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the seller cannot, by agreement or by waiver, make it the
assignor's duty to pay a different price or on different con-
ditions. If the seller is willing to make such a change, he
must trust to the assignee alone.80
This language may seem confusing because assignments and
delegations were treated together. In context, "trust to the as-
signee alone" means loolkng only to the delegate. (principal obli-
gor) and not to the delegating party (surety) for performance of
the obligation that went along with the assignment. Professor
Corbin recognized that changes made in the delegated obligation
without the delegating party's consent discharged the delegating
party Suretyship principles thus wormed their way into the
midst of the doctrine of delegation but required only a passing
reference.
The third edition of Professor Williston's treatise on contract
law"' contained references to involuntary or nonconsensual
suretyship, although these terms were not used. In discussing
successive purchases of mortgaged real property, the treatise
stated summarily- "As between the grantor and grantee, the lat-
ter becomes principal debtor and the former a surety "" Accord-
ingly, the author concluded that a mortgagee's grant of further
time for payment to the grantee (principal) would result in for-
feiture of the mortgagee's rights against the grantor (surety).'
In a discussion of assumption of liabilities of a withdrawing
partner, the treatise concluded: "Questions of suretyship may
arise, analogous to those in mortgage cases where the party
assuming the debt is regarded as the principal debtor."" As did
Professor Corbi's treatise, Professor Williston's treatise recog-
nized the importation of suretyship principles into delegation
doctrine as significant but did not consider it at any great
length.
Nonconsensual suretyship, with its origin in equitable consid-
erations arising from real estate transactions, thus entered into
80. Id. § 866, at 458 (footnote omitted).
81. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs (Walter H.E.
Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1959).
82. Id. § 386.
83. See td.
84. Id. § 388.
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suretyship law whenever duties were delegated, including sales
of goods and other situations, especially partnership dissolu-
tions. The great contract-law treatises also recognized
nonconsensual suretyship in conjunction with the law of delega-
tion. The privileges of nonconsensual suretyship were not given
a central place either in suretyship treatises or contract-law
treatises; rather, they existed on the fringes of both fields of law
For more than a century, however, the impact of applying sure-
tyship principles to delegations has constantly created minor
disturbances in the shadows of contract and suretyship law
III. NONCONSENSUAL SURETYSHIP UNDER THE 1941
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
A. The Recognition of Nonconsensual Suretyship
In 1941, the American Law Institute promulgated the Re-
statement of the Law of Security 5 Sections 82 through 211
covered the subject of suretyship. Section 83, entitled "Creation
of Suretyship," recogmzed nonconsensual suretyship in clause c:
"The suretyship relation is created where the surety having
been a principal obligor, his obligation, without a novation, has
been assumed by another or his property has been transferred
under such circumstances as to place the property under the
primary burden of the obligation."86
Comment e to section 83, which comments on clause c, illus-
trates the applicability of clause c to assumptions of real estate
mortgages in which the vendee is the principal obligor, the ven-
dor (mortgagor) is the surety, and the mortgagee is the credi-
tor." Comment e further advises a creditor to be aware of the
85. RESTATEMENT OF SEC. (1941).
86. Id. § 83(c).
87. Comment e states:
Two important situations under Clause (c) arise within the field of
mortgages. Where a mortgagor transfers mortgaged land, the grantee
usually assumes the mortgage or agrees to take the land subject to the
mortgage. Whatever his agreement, the land remains subject to the mort-
gage unless some action is taken by the mortgagee which releases it.
Where the grantee assumes the mortgage the grantee becomes the princi-
pal obligor and the mortgagor a surety. Where the grantee takes subject
to the mortgage, but without assuming the debt it secures, the land is
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danger of "discharging the surety by dealings with the new pnn-
cipal which alter the principal obligation, as by an extension of
time without the surety's consent."' Comment e thus links
nonconsensual suretyship to the Restatement's rules regarding a
surety's rights to discharge.89 The parenthetical cross-referenc-
es in comment e likewise tie section 83 to the Restatement's
rules for discharge.0 Hence, the 1941 Restatement incorporates
the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship.
The language of section 83(c) is broad enough to encompass
transactions in goods; however, none of the illustrations follow-
ing the comments to section 83 cover nonconsensual suretyship
situations involving sales of goods. Consequently, a lawyer or
judge using the 1941 Restatement has been reqmred to link the
general terms of section 83(c) to delegations of obligations in
sales-of-goods contracts. Several reported cases demonstrate this
linkage.9 Before examining these cases, however, one should
explore sections 122, 128, and 129, which are cross-referenced in
section 83(c), because these cross-referenced sections contain the
specific discharge rules that can be applicable to nonconsensual
sureties.
B. The Restatement of Security: Three Rules for Discharge
1. Section 122: The Creditor's Release of the Principal
Discharges the Surety
Section 122 of the Restatement of Security states a general
rule that, when the creditor releases the principal, the surety
also is discharged.92 This section of the Restatement and its
regarded as beanng the principal burden of the mortgage, and the
mortgagor is a surety to the extent of the value of the land.
Id. § 83 cmt. e (cross-referencing § 114).
88. Id. (cross-referencing §§ 122, 128, 129).
89. This was also the situation in the cases discussed in part II, supra.
90. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 83 cmt. e (cross-referencing §§ 122, 128, 129).
91. See infra part III.C.
92. Section 122 states: "Where the creditor releases a principal, the surety is dis-
charged, unless (a) the surety consents to remain liable notwithstanding the release,
or (b) the creditor in the release reserves his rights against the surety." RESTATE-
MENT OF SEC. § 122. Comment b to section 122 states a rationale for the rule: "If
the principal has no longer a duty as a result of the creditor's act, the surety should
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accompanying comment could have been derived from
Malanaphy v. Fuller & Johnson Manufacturing Co.,"a in which
the creditor's release of a vendee-principal released the vendors-
sureties. Malanaphy clearly demonstrated the common-law rule
that, when a principal obligor's debt was extinguished by agree-
ment with the creditor, the surety's obligation was extinguished.
Section 122 of the 1941 Restatement thus contains a long-estab-
lished common-law rule for discharge, which is linked to
nonconsensual sureties by cross-reference in section 83(c).
In relevant part, comment b to section 122 states a rationale
for the rule:
If the principal has no longer a duty as a result of the
creditor's act, the surety should not be held to an obligation
to answer for a default of that duty Furthermore, if the sure-
ty could be compelled to pay after the principal's release, he
would be entitled to reimbursement if he had become a sure-
ty at the principal's request or with his consent. Such an
outcome would be unfair to the principal after a release be-
cause it would afford the creditor a means of attacking the
principal indirectly through the surety '
Illustrations 1 and 2 following section 122 further clarify the
rule.95 Section 122 details two exceptions to the general release
rule. The surety remains liable upon discharge of the principal
if: (1) the surety consents to remain liable or (2) the creditor in
the release reserves rights against the surety 9 One need not
inquire into the creditor's intent in granting a release. In fact,
the creditor's intent is immaterial. Maintaimng rights against
the surety requires something more than intent. For a creditor
to release a principal without discharging the surety, he must
have the surety's consent or an explicit reservation of rights by
not be held to an obligation to answer for a default of that duty." Id. § 122 cmt. b.
93. 101 N.W 640 (Iowa 1904); see supra part II.B.
94. RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 122 cmt. b.
95. Illustration 1 states: "S at P's request becomes surety to C on an obligation of
P to C. Both S and P are bound jointly on the same instrument. C releases P S is
not liable to C." Id. § 122 illus. 1.
Illustration 2 states: "Same facts as Illustration 1, except that S and P are not
bound jointly. S is not liable to C." Id. § 122 illus. 2.
96. See id. § 122; supra note 41 (discussing the reservation-of-rights doctrine).
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the principal. 7
2. Section 128: Any Modification Agreed Upon by the Creditor
and the Principal Without the Surety's Consent Discharges the
Surety
Section 128 of the 1941 Restatement provides a general rule
that any modification made by agreement between the principal
and the creditor without the surety's consent discharges the
surety unless the modification could only benefit the surety "
An exception exists for compensated sureties.99 As to noncom-
pensated sureties (the residual category to which everyone ex-
cept bonding companies belongs), the principle of strictissimi
juris applies: any modification in the contract between the pnn-
cipal and creditor, apart from time extensions, will result in
discharge of the surety in toto unless the change can only benefit
the surety
The comment to the general rule contained in section 128(a)
states:
Where the nature of the alteration is such that it can only
be beneficial to the surety, he is not discharged whether non-
compensated or compensated. This does not mean that the
creditor can hold the non-compensated surety by showing
that m the particular case the change was beneficial. The
97. See supra note 41.
98. Section 128 states:
Where, without the surety's consent, the principal and the creditor
modify their contract otherwise than by extension of time of payment
(a) the surety, other than a compensated surety, is discharged unless the
modification is of a sort that can only be beneficial to the surety, and
(b) the compensated surety is
i) discharged if the obligation materially increases his risk, and
(ii) not discharged if the risk is not materially increased, but his
obligation is reduced to the extent of loss due to the modification.
RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128.
99. A "compensated surety" in the Restatement of Security is a special species
defined as "a person who engages in the business of executing surety contracts for a
compensation called a premium." I&. § 82 cmt. i. In other words, compensated sure-
ties are bonding companies or insurance companies that write bonds, and it is to
these companies that subsection b of section 128 applies. Compensated sureties are,
by definition, different from nonconsensual sureties; hence, subsection b plays no role
in this Article.
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rule does not permit a speculation as to whether the change
may or may not have been to the non-compensated surety's
advantage. It must be of the sort that by its very nature, m
no circumstances, can increase the risk of such a surety
Some examples are the reduction of the total amount due, or
the reduction of interest."°
Illustration 6, which follows this comment, shows an agree-
ment between principal and creditor for a reduction of rent for a
store from $300 per month to $250 per month."0 I Because this
agreement could only benefit the surety, it would not be a
ground for release. Conversely, any change that is not by its
very nature beneficial to the surety is a ground for discharge
without inquiry into whether actual harm resulted from the
change. Moreover, under section 128, a creditor cannot reserve
rights against a surety while agreeing with the principal obligor
to a change in the underlying obligation owed by the princi-
pal. °2 Section 128 thus embodies the principle of strictzssmz
juris without any escape hatch, as is available under section 122
through the reservation-of-rights doctrine. Except for compensat-
ed sureties, section 128 constitutes an iron-clad rule against
principal-creditor dealings without the surety's consent. °3
3. Sectin 129: By an Agreement To Extend the Principal's
Time for Payment, the Creditor Discharges the Surety
Under section 129 of the 1941 Restatement, a binding agree-
ment to extend the principal's time for payment discharges any
noncompensated surety, unless the creditor reserves rights or
the surety makes a waiver of rights. 4 This rule is a harsh one
100. Id. § 128 cmt. e.
101. Illustration 6 states: "P leases a store from C for five years at a monthly rent
of $300. S is surety for P's performance. C contracts with P to reduce the rent to
$250 a month. S is not discharged since this change can only be beneficial." Id. §
128 illus. 6.
102. See supra note 41 (discussing the reservation-of-rights doctrine).
103. For compensated sureties, i.e., sureties who charge a premium, discharge oc-
curs only to the extent of prejudice suffered. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128(b)(ii).
104. Section 129 states:
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2) and to the rules in
respect of negotiable instruments, where the principal and creditor, with-
out the surety's consent, make a binding agreement to extend the time of
1330.
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for a creditor who has sought to help out a principal and has
neither obtained the surety's consent nor had the wit to reserve
rights.0 5 This rule is in accordance with the holding in Unzon
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hanford,lo' in which the Supreme
Court sustained the sellers' discharge when the buyer assumed
the mortgage debt and agreed with the creditor to a binding
time extension for paying the notes assumed from the sellers.
The Restatement of Security thus adopted another long-standing
common-law rule.
The comment to section 129(1) sets forth the rationale for the
general rule of discharge following a time extension:
A binding extension of time by the creditor to the principal is
a form of modification of the principal's duty; see § 128. Its
effect is stated separately because it is a form of modification
under which the creditor can reserve his rights against the
surety The basic reason for the rule stated in Subsection (1)
is that the surety should not be bound on a duty of the prin-
cipal which he has not guaranteed. The rule can also be sup-
ported because of the possibility that the risk of the surety
will be increased by the extension."
Under section 129(2), a compensated surety is discharged only
pro tanto, i.e., to the extent of harm established as a result of
the extension. For the noncompensated surety, however, strictis-
szmt jurts prevails for the reasons stated in the foregoing quota-
tion. The comment to subsection (2) indicates that the rule for
noncompensated sureties was somewhat divorced from economic
reality-
The rule in respect of [noncompensated] sureties applies even
where, in fact, it can be shown that the particular extension
was beneficial to the surety This is another instance of giv-
ing the surety other than a compensated surety the advan-
payment by the principal, the surety is discharged unless the creditor in
the extension agreement reserves his rights against the surety.
Id. § 129(1). Subsection 2 merely states a special rule for compensated sureties-dis-
charge to the extent of proved harm. See id. § 129(2). This special rule is not rele-
vant to this Article.
105. See supra note 41 (discussing the reservation-of-rights doctrine).
106. 143 U.S. 187 (1892); see supra part II.
107. RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 129 cint. a.
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tage of the rule of strctissni jurls, by which he is dis-
charged by any variation in the performance demanded of
the principal.0 8
As an example, if the principal owes $1000 secured by a
noncompensated surety's promise and the creditor agrees to any
binding time extension without the surety's consent or a reserva-
tion of rights, the surety is discharged even if the pnncipal's
fiscal situation improves during the time period of the extension,
malng payment by the principal more probable.
4. Summary
Sections 122, 128, and 129 are rooted more in metaphysics
than in economic realities. These sections contain tersely
phrased, tightly drawn rules that usually can be applied without
detailed factual inquiry The underlying philosophy of these
sections is simple: the surety agreed to perform a specified obli-
gation under defined conditions; any alteration of the agreed-
upon obligation by any dealing between the principal and credi-
tor, for better or worse, constitutes an imposition of an obliga-
tion to which the surety is a stranger. The imposition of the new
obligation without the surety's consent or a reservation of rights
under section 122 or section 129 is deemed a justification for an
automatic and complete discharge of the surety
Having discussed the general rules relating to discharge, this
Article now investigates the impact of the Restatement of Secu-
rity on cases involving sales of goods and nonconsensual sure-
ties. The cases are few, but lawyers have sought the application
of the foregoing rules, occasionally with success.
C. The 1941 Restatement of Security and Sales of Goods
Many reported cases involving nonconsensual suretyship m
real estate sales have cited the Restatement of Security 109
108. Id. § 129 cmt. e.
109. See, e.g., Swanson v. Krenik, 868 P.2d 297 (Ala. 1994) (entitling the vendors-
subsureties to indemnity, as opposed to contribution, when they paid the outstanding
debt for their vendee-surety, who had sold the encumbered land to a subvendee);
Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68 (D.C. 1979) (rejecting the vendor-surety's defense of
an unconsented-to modification between creditor and vendee-principal because the
1332
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Even comment e to section 83, which merely explains
nonconsensual suretyship, has been cited in at least six reported
opimons."' To date, however, there are only four reported cas-
es in which courts have cited the Restatement of Security in
conjunction with nonconsensual suretyship arising from a dele-
gation of duties in a sale of goods."' An examnnation of the
creditor had not agreed to the vendee's assumption of vendor's obligations); Federal
Land Bank v. Butz, 135 P.2d 883 (Kan. 1943) (entitling- an intermediate vendor to
an injunction preventing the creditor from executing against its property in part
because of its suretyship status, which required that the property of the principal
debtor (vendee) be exhausted first). Yasuna is questionable because notice to a credi-
tor of the situation giving rise to involuntary suretyship (without agreement to that
status) generally is sufficient to create a duty for the creditor to respect the rela-
tionship.
Along with these real estate cases, additional case law cites § 83 when
nonconsensual suretyship status was invoked (wrongfully) in a stock sale in which
the buyer took subject to an outstanding debt for which the stock was security. See
Bell v. Williams, 44 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1941) (suretyship defense unsuccessful); Bell v.
Williams, 41 Pa. D. & C. 253 (1941) (demurrer overruled). For a discussion of cases
involving suretyship in sales of goods, see znfra part IU.C.1-.C.3.
110. Oleson v. Tellson, 98 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1971); Westinghouse Credit
Corp. v. Wolfer, 88 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Ct. App. 1970); Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68;
Schmuckie v. Alvey, 758 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. 1988); Horman v. Gordan, 740 P.2d 1346
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Fluke Capital & Management v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356
(Wash. 1986).
111. For examples of cases involving issues of nonconsensual suretysip in sales of
goods that cite § 83, see Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 650 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1982);
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Wolfer, 88 Cal. Rptr. 654; Twombley v. Wulf, 482 P.2d
166 (Or. 1971). Twombley and Wolfer arose from sales of businesses, including goods,
as going concerns. Only Roscoe was a pure sale-of-goods case. These cases are dis-
cussed in the text.
The fourth case involving § 83 and a sale of goods is Walin v. Young, 180 P.2d
535 (Or. 1947). In Walin, sellers (Hurleys) granted a chattel mortgage in crops to
their corporate creditor. Ic at 536. The creditor, on Hurleys' default, sought to fore-
close on the mortgaged goods that were in the possession of buyers. Id. The buyers
resisted on the grounds of suretyship, namely, that the creditor had released the
buyers (sureties) by releasing to the sellers property that could have paid the out-
standing debt. Id. at 537. Nonconsensual suretysip status was claimed on the theo-
ry that an assumption of payment obligations to the creditor was part of the pur-
chase price for the goods. Id. at 539. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not decide
whether the buyers really were sureties. The court deemed that decision unnecessary
because, to make out the defense claimed, the buyers also would have been required
to show that the creditor knew of their suretyship status, and the pleadings were
insufficient on this point. Id. at 540-41.
Two other cases citing § 83 may have involved goods. The first is Bell v. Wil-
liams, 44 Pa. D. & C. 159. The opinion does not mention any sale of goods, but the
headnote speaks of assuming a payment obligation upon taking an assignment of
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three most prominent cases will explain the relationship be-
tween delegation in sales-of-goods contracts and nonconsensual
suretyship in light of the 1941 Restatement.
1. Oregon. Twombley v Wulf
In 1971, the Oregon Supreme Court cited section 83 in
Twombley v. Wulf,"' a case arsing from a sale of goods in con-
nection with the sale of a business. Twombley sold a phone an-
swering service and a taxi cab service, including three cabs, to
Wulf and Fowles."' As part of the consideration, Wulf and
Fowles agreed to assume an indebtedness of approximately
$2000, the amount Twombley owed to the National Bank of Ore-
gon (bank) on an installment sales contract for one of the
cabs."' The vendees (Wulf and Fowles) took possession of the
cab, made two installment payments, and defaulted."' The bank
foreclosed and sold the cab for $1500, leaving a deficiency "'
The bank assigned the deficiency claim to a credit company,
who sued Twombley (seller and original obligor) on the install-
ment sales contract."7 Twombley settled the claim by tender of
a promissory note and sued her buyers, who had assumed the
.personal property." Id. at 159. The doctrine of nonconsensual suretyship was no
help because the person claiming its benefits was actually the person assuming the
obligation-a principal obligor. Id. at 161. A second case that may have involved
goods is Oleson v. Tellson, 98 Cal. Rptr. 668. The court made it clear. that there
was a nonconsensual suretyship because there was an assumption of a payment
obligation in the sale of a business, id. at 669, but nothing in the opinion states
that goods were part of the sale. For further discussion of Oleson, see infra note
142.
112. 482 P.2d 166 (Or. 1971). The court did not decide whether Article 2 of the
UCC applied. Clearly, however, because goods were part of the transaction, there is,
at minimum, a strong argument that the sale was subject to Article 2. See, e.g.,
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980).
113. Twombley, 482 P.2d at 167-68. The court decided the case without reference to
Article 2 because no Article 2 principles were needed for a resolution of the issues
raised. Were it necessary to decide on the applicability of Article 2, however, the
argument for Article 2 coverage is strong. Many courts apply Article 2 directly or by
analogy to the sale of a business, even when goods are not the predominant factor
in the sale. See, e.g., Zapatha, 408 N.E.2d at 1375 & n.9 (citing cases).
114. Twombley, 482 P.2d at 168.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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debt and defaulted."' The buyers defended on the theory that,
because plaintiff had not yet paid in cash, she could prove no
loss for which she was owed reimbursement.'19 The trial court
found the buyers liable for the deficiency owing on the install-
ment contract plus interest, and the Supreme Court of Oregon
affirmed. 20 In its discussion, the court cited section 83 of the
Restatement of Security and made it clear that the seller's sta-
tus as a nonconsensual surety was significant for the outcome.
The court stated:
Upon executing the contract wherein [Wulf and Fowles]
agreed to assume plaintiffs indebtedness to the bank on the
retail installment sales contract the parties to the con-
tract, with respect to that covenant, created a relationship of
involuntary suretyship whereby [Wulf and Fowles] became
the principal obligors on the indebtedness due for the bal-
ance of the cab, and the plaintiff acquired the privileges of a
surety As surety on the indebtedness, plaintiffs right of
action against [Wulf and Fowlesi accrued at the time she
paid the indebtedness for which [Wulf and Fowles] were
primarily liable. 2'
The court went on to consider whether the issuance of the
negotiable instrument was the type of payment that triggered
the right of reimbursement. Citing, inter alia, section 107 of the
1941 Restatement, 22 the court held that the note was pay-
ment; thus, the decision in favor of the seller (surety) against
her buyers (principals) succeeded. 2 ' Nonconsensual suretyship
status undergirded the court's affirmation of the trial court's
decision by supplying the justification for reimbursement upon
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 168-70. The vendees were allowed a set-off of $150 for payment of a
claim that the vendor (Twombley) was supposed to have paid under the original
sales agreement. Id. at 168.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. "Where a creditor accepts from the surety in discharge of the principal's ma-
tured duty a negotiable instrument on which the surety is liable for an amount
equal to or less than the amount due from the principal, the principal is under an
immediate duty to reimburse the surety to the amount of the instrument." Id. at
169 (quoting RESTATIEMENT OF SEC. § 107 (1941)).
123. Id.
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the surety's issuance of the promissory note. For purposes of this
Article, one need only note that Twombley's delegation of her
obligation to pay for a tam cab resulted in nonconsensual surety-
ship, a status that sustained the court's decision.
2. California: Westinghouse Credit Corp. v Wolfer
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Wolfer" is a 1970 case involv-
ing a sale of goods in which the court cited section 83 and other
sections of the Restatement of Security Griffin purchased res-
taurant equipment on credit pursuant to a written agree-
ment.'25 The seller assigned its rights to Westinghouse Credit
Corp. (Westinghouse).126 After about six months, Griffin sold
the equipment to Wolfer. As part of the consideration, Wolfer as-
sumed Griffin's payment obligations to Westinghouse.'27 Short-
ly thereafter, Wolfer sold the equipment to Savoy, who agreed to
assume the payments to Westinghouse as part of the consider-
ation paid. 2 ' Soon after Westinghouse learned of the assump-
tion by Savoy, the payments stopped.'29
Westinghouse sued Griffin, Wolfer, and Savoy for the balance
owing."' Savoy settled with Westinghouse and executed a con-
ditional stipulation of judgment in exchange for being allowed to
continue in business while making smaller payments over a
longer period of time.' 3 ' Wolfer refused to agree to the settle-
ment, disclaiming any liability, and neglected to answer or ap-
pear in the court action.'32 Savoy failed to make the reduced
payments as required under the settlement agreement; there-
fore, Westinghouse had the stipulated judgment entered against
124. 88 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Ct. App. 1970).
125. The court also mentioned related items, but the opimon never disclosed any-
thing of consequence besides the restaurant equipment that Wolfer and her vendee
apparently were using as part of an ongoing enterprise. Id. at 655-56.
126. Id. at 655.
127. Id. at 655-56.
128. Id. at 656.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Wolfer and Savoy had the same lawyer, which may have caused some of
the difficulties in the case. Id.
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Savoy and obtained a default judgment against Wolfer.'33
When a levy was made against her bank account and safe depos-
it box, Wolfer sought to have the default set aside on the basis of
her status as a nonconsensual surety "
In pursuing her motion to set aside the default judgment,
Wolfer argued that, when Savoy assumed her obligation to pay
for the restaurant equipment, Savoy became a principal and she
a surety and that, once Westinghouse knew of this, it was bound
to respect her status.135 Having negotiated a settlement ex-
tending the time for payment without her consent, Westing-
house discharged her-or so she argued in support of the motion
to set aside the default."' The trial court denied her motion,
and the appellate court affirmed, though not without recognizing
the merits of her argument."7
In relevant part, the appellate court stated:
We believe that [Wolfer] did have a meritorious defense to
Westinghouse's suit against her. A surety is, among other
things, one who promises to answer for the debt of another.
In a suretyship relation there are two obligors and one obli-
gee who is entitled to but one performance. When Savoy
assumed [Wolfer]'s debt to Westinghouse, [Savoy] became the
principal obligor and [Wolfer] became the surety As soon as
Westinghouse learned of the assumption by Savoy of
[Wolfer]'s debt to Westinghouse, Westinghouse was required
to recognize the relation of suretyship between Savoy and
[Wolfer] and respect it in all of its subsequent dealings with
them. This it did not do. Instead, without [Wolfer]'s consent
and without any reservation of its rights against [Wolfer], it
extended Savoy's time for payment and thereby exonerated
[Wolfer] from the debt.'
Unfortunately, however, the meritorious defense was not
enough to justify setting aside the default judgment. Wolfer was
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 656-58.
138. Id. at 656-57 (citing REsTATEMENT OF SEC. §§ 82, 83(c) (1941)) (citations
omitted).
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also required to show that she had been denied a fair opportum-
ty to present the defense."' She did not do this in her submis-
sions because her dealings with her lawyer were not dis-
closed. 4 ° The court, however, explicitly recognized the impor-
tance of nonconsensual suretyship as a basis for discharge when
the status arose in taking over a seller's payment obligations in
the purchase of goods.1 '
If Wolfer had answered and properly pled the defense, the
rule contained in section 129(1) would have exonerated her.
Quite clearly, the California court did not object to blending the
law of delegation and principles of discharge derived from the
status of nonconsensual suretyship." The delegation itself cre-
ated the suretyship status that gave rise to the defense.
3. Arizona: Western Coach Corp. v Roscoe
The most recent case combining a sale of goods with the Re-
statement of Security's privileges for nonconsensual sureties is
Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe,'43 decided by the Supreme
Court of Arizona sitting en banc in 1982. What started as a
simple secured sale of a mobile home generated a complex web
of relationships including claims for discharge as nonconsensual
139. Id. at 657.
140. Id. The record did not sustain her claim that she defaulted because of her
lawyer's failure to represent her. Id. Because she failed to answer, she lost her mer-
itorious suretyship defense. Id.
141. The court did not discuss the applicability of Article 2. Because equipment
(goods) was part of the transaction, however, one can make an argument for Article
2's applicability. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1994); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d
1370 (Mass. 1980).
142. In a second California case involving nonconsensual sureties, arismg from the
sale of a business, the court cited § 83 but did not allow discharge. See Oleson v.
Tellson, 98 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1971). Seller sold a business, which may have
included merchandise, to the Tellsons, who signed a note as payment. Id. at 669.
Seller assigned the note to the Olesons. Id. The Tellsons then sold the business to
the Wikes, who assumed the note, and informed the Olesons of the sale and as-
sumption. Id. The Wikes were later discharged in bankruptcy, and the Olesons (cred-
itors) called on the Tellsons for payment. Id. While there is little doubt that the
Tellsons rightly characterized themselves as nonconsensual sureties, there were no
grounds for discharging them because their complaints, failure to accelerate and
receiving only interest, were not binding extensions or other changes in the underly-
ing agreement.
143. 650 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc).
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sureties.'" Marvin and Carole Roscoe (Roscoe Jr.) bought a
mobile home from Western Coach Corp. (Western Coach) by a
retail installment contract.'45 J.E. and Florence Roscoe (Roscoe
Sr.) guaranteed payment. 4 ' Western Coach immediately as-
signed its rights as seller with a right of recourse in the event
that the buyers defaulted. 47
Through the course of intermediate assignments, Western
Coach's rights were assigned to Delta Investment Co. (Del-
ta).48 Meanwhile, Roscoe Jr. sold the mobile home to Love,
who assumed the payments to Delta. Love sold to Chambers,
who in turn assumed the payment obligations to Delta. 50
Eventually, Chambers defaulted.'5 ' Western Coach paid Delta
under its recourse obligation 52 and repossessed the mobile
home at Chambers's request.'53 The mobile home was in bad
shape; therefore, in addition to the pay-out to Delta, Western
Coach incurred the costs of: unpaid taxes, towing, moving, stor-
ing, and repairing and refurbishing the mobile home."M West-
ern Coach sued both sets of Roscoes for reimbursement because
Roscoe Jr. was the principal obligor and Roscoe Sr. was a surety
by express agreement.'55
Roscoe Jr., the principal obligor before the first transfer, as-
serted the suretyship defense that, when Western Coach, with-
out his consent, agreed to Love's sale to Chambers, the contract
was modified without his consent. As a nonconsensual surety, he
argued that the modification effected his discharge.'56 At trial,
144. Id. at 454-55.
145. Id. at 452.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. A recourse obligation is a suretyship obligation.
153. Roscoe, 650 P.2d at 452.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 453.
156. Id. at 454-55. The opinion does not specifically set out arguments made before
the trial judge. The reconstruction above is based on the trial judge's decisions and
the issues preserved for appeal. Curiously, m characterizing the Roscoes' argument
on appeal, the appellate court took pains to state that the Roscoes were not arguing
1996] 1339
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1307
Western Coach obtained a jury verdict against the Roscoes.'57
The Roscoes appealed, arguing, inter alia, the suretyship de-
fense. The appellate court acknowledged that, if Roscoe Jr.'s
suretyship argument were valid, it would also work for Roscoe
Sr., the original consensual surety who would have been subro-
gated to Roscoe Jr.'s rights.' 5 The argument was found want-
ing, however, because, in the sale from Love to Chambers, the
record sustained the jury's implied finding that there was no
modification of the obligation contained in the installment con-
tract."'59 According to the court: "there was evidence which per-
mitted the finder of fact to conclude that the Roscoes' rights
against Love were unaffected by Love's sale to Chambers, with
the result that the Roscoes were not released from their obliga-
tions whether they were principal debtors or sureties for Love's
assumed performance." 6 '
Roscoe Jr. thus was not denied the suretyship status attained
as a seller whose buyer assumed the debt. The status, however,
coupled with the downstream sale from Love to Chambers with
Western Coach's consent, did not constitute a reason for dis-
charge. Everything hinged on the fact that the obligation in the
principal contract was not modified. At a minmum, there was
enough evidence for the jury to have found that it was not modi-
fied.'6 ' The court noted that the Roscoes had not argued im-
pairment of security, 6' which might have been a successful ar-
gument if the creditor (Western Coach) had done something
discharge by the mere addition of a party, a matter on which authorities were split.
See id. at 455 n.5. This argument actually seems very close to, or embraced within,
the argument that the Roscoes made on appeal.
157. Id. at 453. The trial judge first granted a directed verdict for Roscoes Jr. and
Sr. After further argument, however, the court granted Western Coach's motion for a
new trial. Western Coach won the new trial. Id.
158. Id. at 454.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 455.
161. One should note that evidence of postdelegation conduct can effect a modifica-
tion under § 128. Comment b to § 128 states: "The permitted variation of perfor-
mance by the principal is in. reality an alteration of the contract by substituted
performance, although it frequently is evidenced by the circumstances, especially by
the conduct of the parties, rather than by any specific agreement." RESTATEMENT OF
SEC. § 128 cmt. b (1941).
162. Roscoe, 650 P.2d at 455 n.5.
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negligent that led to the deterioration of the mobile home." In
any event, the Roscoes were liable for reimbursing Western
Coach."
If the jury had found that the sale to Chambers involved a
change that justified resort to section 128, then the court prob-
ably would have allowed discharge on the basis of Roscoe Jr.'s
nonconsensual suretyship status coupled with a well-established
rule for discharge. As in the foregoing cases, the delegation of
the duty to pay for goods triggered the use of the suretyship
defense. In an elaborate opimon, the court wove delegation in a
sale of goods together with nonconsensual suretyship law
4. Summary
While case law blending the 1941 Restatement's principles of
nonconsensual suretyship and the law of delegation in sales-of-
goods contracts is sparse, the foregoing cases illustrate the sev-
eral contexts in which sellers whose debt obligations were as-
sumed by their buyers in contracts involving sales of goods have
raised suretyship defenses." Without question, suretyship law
and the law of delegation intersect in sales of goods, even if case
law seldom recogmzes the intersection. Furthermore, the surety-
ship principles incorporated into the Restatement of Security
obviously were extracted from older common law Whenever
applicable, these principles are a powerful weapon for the
seller's lawyer if the buyer (principal obligor) and the creditor do
any dealing without the seller's (surety's) consent. The applica-
tion or nonapplication of suretyship principles can mean victory
or defeat, as Wolfer demonstrated.
IV DELEGATION CASES ARISING UNDER UCC SECTION 2-210:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE USE OF SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLES IN
CASES GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 2
A. General Principles of Delegatin Under Article 2
From the foregoing discussion, one can easily discern the
163. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 132.
164. Roscoe, 650 P.2d at 455-56.
165. For Article 2's coverage, see U.C.C. §§ 2-102, -105(1) (1994); infra part VII.
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applicability of suretyship principles when there is a sale of
goods on which a debt is owed and the buyer assumes the debt
as part of the purchase price. One should understand, however,
that, under contracts governed by Article 2, duties can be dele-
gated by sellers or buyers.166 Section 2-210 contains selected
principles of delegation that are controlling for contracts covered
by Article 2.167 According to section 2-210 comment 7, "[t]his
section is not intended as a complete statement of the law of
delegation and assignment but is limited to clarifying a few
points doubtful under the case law "" Additional principles
and concepts can flow in through section 1-103.169
As a fundamental matter, therefore, one must reach beyond
the Code for definitions of "assignment" and "delegation," as the
terms are used in section 2-210. An "assignment" is a transfer of
a contract right, or the right to receive performance. 70 A "dele-
gation" is the empowerment of a person (delegate) to perform a
duty that the delegating party owes to another.' As Profes-
sors Knapp and Crystal point out in their widely used contracts
casebook, an assignment is akin to passing a football or baton;
creating a new right in the assignee extinguishes the right of
the assignor.'72 Delegation is aln to the dissemination of a
contagious disease; you can pass it on, but you do not get nd of
it. 73
Of the five subsections in section 2-210, four explicitly per-
tain to delegation. Only subsection 2 is limited by its terms to
166. See U.C.C. § 2-210.
167. Section 2-210 probably will be revised and renumbered. See infra part VII.B.
168. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 7.
169. See id. § 1-103 (concerning the applicability of supplementary principles of
law).
170. FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, § 11.1. Professor Farnsworth states: "An obligee's
transfer of a contract right is known as an assignment of the right. By an assign-
ment, the obligee as assignor (B) transfers to an assignee (C) a right that the as-
signor has against an obligor (A)." Id.
171. Id. Professor Farnsworth states: "An obligor's empowering of another to per-
form the obligor's duty is known as a delegation of the performance of that duty. By
a delegation, the obligor as delegating party (B) empowers a delegate (C) to perform
a duty that the delegating party owes to an obligee (A)." Id.
172. CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 1233
(3d ed. 1993).
173. Id. at 1233-34.
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rules of assignment. 74 In pertinent part, section 2-210 reads
as follows:
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate un-
less otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a sub-
stantial interest in having his original promisor perform or
control the acts required by the contract. No delegation of
performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to
perform or any liability for breach.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary a prohi-
bition of assignment of "the contract" is to be construed as
barring only the delegation to the assignee of the assignor's
performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights
under the contract" or an assignment in similar general
terms is an assignment of rights and unless the language or
the circumstances (as m an assignment for security) indicate
the contrary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties of
the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a
promise by him to perform those duties. This proise is en-
forceable by either the assignor or the other party to the
original contract.
(5) The other party may treat any assignment which dele-
gates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecu-
rity and may without prejudice to his rights against the as-
signor demand assurances from the assignee. (Section 2-609).175
This language is tight but easily unraveled. Delegation is gen-
erally permissible unless otherwise agreed or unless the obligee
has a substantial interest in having the original promisor per-
form. Delegation, however, does not relieve the delegating party
of the duty to perform. 76 To illustrate, a seller may delegate
the duty to deliver farm machinery as promised in a contract for
sale, but the seller remains liable to the buyer for failure to
deliver and for any nonconforming tender. Likewise, a buyer
may delegate the duty to pay (or any other duty), but, after the
174. See U.C.C. § 2-210 (1994).
175. Id. § 2-210(1), (3)-(5).
176. Id. § 2-210(1).
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delegation, the buyer remains liable for failure to pay and for
any other failure of performance required of the buyer under the
contract. The delegating party can be released by a novation
(meaning an agreed substitution of parties), but this requires
the importation of non-Code principles.'77 Finally, section 2-
210(4) aids in construction by stating that an assignment of the
whole contract carries the meamng of delegation as well as as-
signment. Hence, "assigning a contract" transfers the burdens as
well as the benefits, malng the transferee a delegate as well as
177. As a leading treatise states:
A novation is generally defined as a mutual agreement among all parties
concerned for the discharge of a valid existing obligation by the substitu-
tion of a new valid obligation on the part of the debtor or another, or a
like agreement for the discharge of a debtor to his creditor by the substi-
tution of a new creditor.
58 AM. JUR. 2D Novation § 1 (1989); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
280 (1979). The Restatement requires a substitution of parties, i.e., either the obligor
or obligee must be new m a novation. See id. American Jurisprudence and the au-
thorities it cites, however, allow for a novation between original parties. See 58 AM.
JUR. 2D Novation § 3.
An excellent case on nonconsensual suretyship m which the court discussed
novation and cited § 83 of the Restatement of Security is Horman v. Gordon, 740
P.2d 1346 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Horman, the purchaser of a shopping center
(Kingston) assumed three promissory notes as part of the purchase price. Id. at
1348. The purchaser thereby became the principal obligor, and the original obligor
(Gordon) attained the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship. By releasing the princi-
pal obligor for a stipulated price without a reservation of rights, the creditor unwit-
tingly released the surety (Gordon), from whom the creditor had hoped to collect. Id.
at 1354.
In discussing novation, the court stated:
It is undisputed that the original obligations between Horman
[creditor] and Gordon were valid, and that a new, valid contract was
entered into between Kingston and Gordon when Kingston assumed
Gordon's obligations to Horman in connection with his purchase of the
Sherwood Shopping Center. Horman, however, even though aware of
Kingston's assumption of Gordon's debts, never agreed to it and never
released Gordon from the obligations, but continued to look to him for
payment on the notes. The authorities agree that for novation to take
place, all parties must agree, at the time of substitution, that the
creditor's consent constituted a discharge of the original obligor.
Because the intent of the parties to cause a novation cannot be
presumed but must be clear, and because there is no evidence of such in-
tent in the record but only evidence to the contrary, we cannot conclude
that a novation occurred.
Id. at 1353 (citations omitted). Hence, novation required clear proof of intent to
discharge one obligor and to accept a substitute.
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an assignee.'
Much important law is not stated in the text of section 2-210
or its comments, namely, the relevant rules of suretyship. When-
ever a delegation is made in a contract covered by section 2-210,
whether or not an assignment is made, the delegation creates a
nonconsensual suretyship: the delegate becomes a principal, the
delegating party becomes a surety, and the party to whom a
duty is owed becomes a creditor or obligee in the tripartite sure-
tyship relationship.
If a seller delegates a duty, the duty commonly is one to deliv-
er goods promised under a contract for sale coupled with an
assignment of the right to payment. For example, a manufactur-
er may delegate a duty to deliver specially fabricated goods, or a
farmer may delegate a duty to deliver commodities. The delegate
may or may not become an assignee of the right to payment. If a
buyer delegates a duty, that duty commonly is one to pay along
with an assignment of a right to take delivery of the goods. An
example is a grain buyer who delegates the obligation to pay
along with an assignment of the right to take delivery of the
grain. Delegation and assignment commonly go together, but
there can be delegation without assignment, and, of course,
there are many assignments without delegation.
Section 2-210 is not a judicially overworked section; it has
been cited in less than sixty reported opimons.'79 Moreover,
section 2-210 has often been cited in opinmons explaining its non-
applicability 180 Elsewhere, section 2-210 has been cited for its
178. See U.C.C. § 2-210(4).
179. As of February 1996, an examination of the UCC Digest 2210, all state
annotated codes, and a Westlaw search yielded 57 opinions citing § 2-210.
180. For example, Arkansas appellate courts have cited § 2-210 three times but
have never applied it. See Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922, 932 n.1 (Ark. 1970)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting m part and concurring in part) (citing § 2-210 as part of a
jurisprudential argument against implying a warranty on heating and air condition-
ing ductwork); Newton v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 668 S.W.2d 51 (Ark. Ct. App.
1984) (citing § 2-210(4) but determining that the plumbing contract m question was
governed by the common law of contract rather than Article 2); Pemberton v. Arkan-
sas State Highway Comm'n, 597 S.W.2d 605 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that,
while the facts showed a sale of goods (rock), there was no assignment to trigger
the applicability of § 2-210). Simply, many citations to § 2-210 appear in cases that
have nothing to do with delegation and, therefore, are of no value for the purpose of
this Article.
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embodiment of principles relating to delegation and assignment,
even though Article 2 did not apply to the case sub judice."'5 In
a majority of the remaining cases in which section 2-210 was
employed because a buyer or seller made a delegation or assign-
ment in connection with a sale-of-goods contract, the courts cited
section 2-210 only in connection with assignments.182 Approxi-
mately one-third of the reported opinions citing section 2-210
display fact patterns involving delegations. The Author's re-
search has yielded only eight cases in which sellers made dele-
gations incontrovertibly governed by section 2-210" and two
more in which the facts showed some reasonable grounds for
arguing that such a delegation had been made."'4 In other cas-
181. See, e.g., In re F & T Contractors, Inc., 17 B.R. 966 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Macke
Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, Inc., 270 A.2d 645 (Md. 1970). In Macke, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland upheld a delegation and assignment in which the contract
under scrutiny involved a license or concession for cold drink vending machines.
Article 2 did not apply, but the court cited § 2-210 for its liberality in allowing
delegations. Id. at 649. The issue in In re F & T Contractors was whether the FDIC
had assumed liabilities (delegation) in conjunction with an assumption of rights (as-
signment) when it took over a bank. In re F & T Contractors, 17 B.R. at 968. The
court cited § 2-210 to support the proposition that a delegation can be implied when
an assignee gains the benefits of a contract without expressly assuming attendant
obligations. Id. at 988.
182. See U.C.C. Case Dig. 2210 (1994).
183. See May-Som Gulf, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 869 F.2d 917, 924-25 (6th Cir.
1989) (involving delegation of a franchisor's obligations under service station fran-
chises); Ackley v. Gulf Oil Corp., 726 F Supp. 353, 361-64 (D. Conn.) (involving
delegation of a franchisor's obligations under service station franchises), affd, 889
F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1989); Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc, 686 F
Supp. 1319, 1335 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving delegation of an obligation for production
and delivery of component parts for valves); Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F
Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (involving delegation of an obligation to build and deliv-
er a houseboat), affd, 574 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978); Buckeye Ag-Center, Inc. v.
Babchuck, 533 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (involving delegation of an obligation
to deliver corn); T.W Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1973)
(involving delegation of an obligation to deliver crushed rock); Webber v. McCoy
Lumber Co., 303 S.E.2d 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (involving delegation of an obliga-
tion to deliver lumber); Shapiro Bros. Factors Corp. v. Guy Hobbs, Inc., 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 817 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1968) (involving delegation of an
obligation to deliver "merchandise" not described in the opimon).
184. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 606, 610-11 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (involving an arguable delegation of an obligation to deliver health care
products); Rural Elec. Convemence Coop. Co. v. Soyland Power Coop., Inc., 606
N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving delegation of an obligation to sup-
ply electric power). In Rural Electric, the Illinois Court of Appeals determined that
1996] PRIVILEGES OF SURETYSHIP 1347
es, buyers alleged that the seller had delegated performance ob-
ligations, but the facts did not support the allegations. 8 ' The
case reports contain at least nine cases citing section 2-210 in
which the fact patterns demonstrate delegations by buyers.'
In two other cases involving sales of goods, one of the parties
urged that there had been a buyer's delegation governed by sec-
tion 2-210, but the facts did not warrant its application.'87
the transfer of the obligation to deliver power from one utility to another fell outside
of Article 2, zd. at 1275-76, an issue on which courts disagree. In Baxter Healthcare,
the district court assumed that § 2-210 applied. See Baxter Healthcare, 869 F Supp.
at 610. The 'delegation," if any, however, was a result of the seller's major stock-
holders selling 95% of the seller's stock to a corporate competitor of the buyer.
'While control over the seller corporation changed, there was no transfer of the
seller's obligation to a new legal entity. The court's assumption that § 2-210 con-
trolled the delegation, therefore, is questionable.
185. See, e.g., Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Fairway Private Cars, Inc., 590 F
Supp. 10, 16-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding no facts to sustain the buyer's allegation
that the finance company, Associates Capital Services, had assumed warranty obli-
gations by taking an assignment of an account receivable); Pendarvis v. General
Motors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that
an assignee's acceptance of rights under a retail sale installment contract did not
justify the claim that the assignee had accepted the seller's warranty obligations).
186. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855
(10th Cir. 1993) (involving assignment of the duty to take and pay for natural gas);
Midwest Precision Servs., Inc. v. PTM Indus. Corp., 887 F.2d 1128 (1st Cir. 1989)
(involving delegation of the duty by lessor in finance lease whereby lessee assumed
obligation to inspect, accept or reject, and allow for cure upon supplier's delivery of
industrial machine); Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1982) (involving dele-
gation of the obligation to. receive and pay for cattle); Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v.
Waldrep, 377 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (involving delegation of an obligation to
receive and pay for cotton); Aslakson v. Home Sav. Ass'n, 416 N.W.2d 786 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (involving delegation of an obligation to pay for a mobile home fol-
lowing two failed attempts to delegate); Rosenberg v. Son, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 71 (N.D.
1992) (involving delegation of the obligation to pay for a Dairy Queen and the goods
included with the business); C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
321 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas) (involving delegation of an obligation to pay for cocktail
lounge equipment), affd, 214 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1965); McKinme v. Milford, 597 S.W.2d
953 (Tax. Civ. App. 1980) (involving delegation of an obligation to make a horse
available for two breedings per year); Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.W.2d 346,
352 (Tax. Civ. App. 1976) (involving delegation of an obligation to receive and pay
for cotton). In Jonnet, the trial court cited § 2-210(1) for the proposition that delega-
tion alone does not relieve the delegating party of its contractual obligations. Jonnet,
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 322. In affirming the decision, however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not cite § 2-210.
187. See De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 305 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1973). In
De La Rosa, there were a series of stock and asset sales involving delegations (as-
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To date, only one court has discussed explicitly a defense
based on nonconsensual suretyship when citing section 2-
210.18 After a discussion of this case, this Article will further
explore the confluence of suretyship law and delegation under
section 2-210 by examining selected delegation cases to expose
the possibilities of applying suretyship law
B. Rosenberg v Son, Inc.-Sale of a Dairy Queen
In Rosenberg v. Son, Inc.,"' the Rosenbergs agreed to sell
Pratt a Dairy Queen located in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The
sale included the franchise, inventory, and equipment for a price
of $62,000 to be paid over a period of fifteen years.' ° Pratt as-
signed her contract to Son, Inc. (Son), meamng that Son as-
sumed her payment obligations as well as her rights. As part of
the agreement, Son agreed to indemnify Pratt in the event of
loss.'9 ' Son subsequently assigned the Rosenberg contract to
Merit Corp. (Merit), who thereby assumed the remaining debt
obligation to the Rosenbergs. The Rosenbergs explicitly agreed to
the assignment and delegation to Son, and they acquiesced in
the assignment and delegation to Merit by accepting a substan-
tial payment from Merit.9 '
Merit quit paying the Rosenbergs, leaving a substantial un-
paid balance. When Merit subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the
sumptions of debt). De La Rosa, 298 So. 2d at 472. De La Rosa, however, who was
at the end of the chain, bought without assuming any debt. Id. After citing § 2-210,
the court stated that 'telven the liberalized approach of the code, however, doesn't
make one liable on an obligation where he merely purchased a chattel, or chattels
as here, without assumption of the obligation." Id. at 473. In Field, the seller, Gold-
en Triangle, argued that § 2-210 applied when the buyer of the assets of two radio
stations intended to delegate his rights and obligations to a newly formed corpora-
tion. Field, 305 A.2d at 695. The court declined to apply Article 2, noting that only
4.6% of the purchase price was allocated to goods. Id. at 696 & n.9.
188. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 71. The case involved North Dakota's adoption of §
2-210. It was not mentioned in the UCC Reporting Service but clearly belongs with
§ 2-210 cases, as the court cited N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-17 (1983), which is North
Dakota's adoption of § 2-210.
189. 491 N.W.2d 71.
190. Id. at 72.
191. This agreement included an obligation to indemnify Pratt if she were liable to
the Rosenbergs following Son's default. Id. at 73 & n.3.
192. Id. at 73.
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Rosenbergs sued Son and Pratt for the outstanding balance. 93
The trial court granted summary judgment for Pratt and
Son.9 4  While the trial court's reasoning as to Son is
unclear,'95 the court justified summary judgment in Pratt's fa-
vor on the basis of nonconsensual suretyship. The court rea-
soned that Merit's conduct, acquiesced to by the Rosenbergs, had
modified the principal obligation, thereby discharging Pratt, who
had the status of an involuntary or nonconsensual surety '
The Supreme Court of North Dakota summarized the trial
court's rationale as follows: "The trial court found that moving
the business, the second assignment to Merit, and pledging
business assets as collateral, all without Pratt's knowledge,
constituted alterations in the underlying obligation. Therefore,
because it determined that Pratt was a guarantor on the con-
tract, she was exonerated by the trial court."19 '
The trial court apparently blended the law of delegation with
nonconsensual suretyship status to justify granting a discharge
to Pratt on account of unauthorized downstream changes in the
underlying obligation. The trial court's reasoning is remarkably
similar to arguments raised in Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.
Wolfer, 9' which involved two assignments and delegations in a
sale of restaurant equipment. Pratt's summary discharge proba-
bly was consistent with section 128 of the Restatement of Secu-
rity, assuming that there was sufficient proof of some action
amounting to a modification by conduct.'99 Unfortunately for
193. Id.
194. Id. at 73-74.
195. It is difficult to understand the trial court's reasoning respecting Son. Al-
though the Rosenbergs asserted direct claims against Son, the trial court believed
that Son should be dismissed if Pratt were dismissed because Son's liability, if any,
had to rest on mdemnity alone. Id. at 74 n.6. By assuming payment obligations
from Pratt, however, Son should have been directly liable to the Rosenbergs unless
it had a suretyship defense or could prove a novation.
196. Id. at 74.
197. Id.
198. 88 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Ct. App. 1970); see supra part III.C.2.
199. For a discussion of § 128, see supra part IH.B.2. Section 128 allows discharge
because of modifications that do not by their very nature benefit a surety. Modifica-
tions can come about by conduct, i.e., variations to performance acquiesced in by the
creditor without explicit agreement. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128 cmt. b (1941).
Nothing in the appellate opinion, however, shows that the court or counsel consulted
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Pratt, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed."' In the
Author's view, the supreme court's opinion is significant and
commendable for its recognition of nonconsensual suretyship in
the context of a delegation governed by section 2-210, but the
opinion is subject to criticism for its failure to apply sound and
generally recognized suretyship principles.
The supreme court's analysis began with an acknowledgment
that Pratt's delegation did not exonerate her, the delegating
party On this point, the court quoted North Dakota's adoption
of section 2-210(1): "No delegation of performance relieves the
party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for
breach."2"' The court next determined that the assignment and
delegation from Pratt to Son had not resulted in a novation by
express agreement.0 2 While the Rosenbergs had expressly ap-
proved the transfer of rights and obligations, they had not
agreed to a substitution of parties.2 3 The court next recognized
Pratt's status as an involuntary surety- "An assignment will not
extinguish the relationship and obligations between the two
original contracting parties. However, an assignment does result
in the assignor having a surety relationship, albeit involuntary,
with the assignee 2)204
After this recognition of involuntary suretyship, the court's
opinion took some twists and turns that make the opinion diffi-
cult to follow The court declared that Pratt (seller) and Son
(buyer) had a suretyship relationship, meaning that Pratt was a
surety and Son a principal, but that Pratt was not a surety as to
the Rosenbergs.0 5 While this matter was an open question at
the Restatement of Security.
200. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 78.
201. Id. at 74 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-17(l) (1983)) (emphasis deleted).
The court also cited 4 CORBIN, supra note 78, § 866, at 452. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d
at 74. For a discussion of Professor Corbm's work, see supra notes 78-80 and accom-
panying text.
202. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 75.
203. "Thus, the express language of the agreement and intent of the parties at the
time the assignment was made did not contemplate a novation by releasing Pratt
and substituting Son, Inc., m her stead." Id. at 76.
204. Id. For its conclusion that Pratt was a surety, the court cited 72 C.J.S. Pnnct-
pal and Surety § 35 (1987), but made no citation to the Restatement of Security,
Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 76.
205. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 76.
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the time of Brandt's second edition,"' subsequent treatises and
the Restatement of Security had long ago adopted the judicially
created proposition that nonconsensual suretyship confers privi-
leges in regard to the creditor, not merely a right of reimburse-
ment against a principal obligor.0 7 The court -thus recognized
nonconsensual suretyship status, but it immediately stripped
the status of its significance in light of commonly accepted dis-
charge rules."8
Nonetheless, in the next paragraph, the court reinjected rights
akin to suretyship:
The inquiry as to Pratt's liability does not end at this junc-
ture. Pursuant to guaranty law, the trial court released Pratt
from any liability on the contract due to the changes or alter-
ations which took place following her assignment to Son, Inc.
While it is true that Pratt cannot be forced to answer on the
contract irrespective of events occurring subsequent to her
assignment, it is also true that she cannot be exonerated for
every type of alteration or change that may develop.2"
If Pratt was not a surety in relation to the Rosenbergs, the
question remains why any events subsequent to her assignment
would exonerate her. In this language, the court seems to have
reinstated suretyship rights for Pratt in relation to the
Rosenbergs while denying her the designation of involuntary
surety in that relationship. The court went further, however,
and required additional proof beyond merely establishing that a
modification had occurred. Citing Professor Corbin, C.J.S., and
case law, the court determined that not every alteration would
effect a discharge but that only an alteration (modification) prej-
udicial to the surety would result in discharge.210 The law as
206. See supra note 68.
207. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text; supra part III.
208. Of course, § 83 of the Restatement of Security explicitly cross-references the
discharge rules in §§ 122, 128, and 129. See supra part III.A.
209. Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 76.
210. Id. at 76-77 (citing Walker v. Rednalloh Co., 13 N.E.2d 394 (Mass. 1938));
Jedco Dev. Co. v. Bertsch, 441 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1989); 4 CORBIN, supra note 78, §
866, at 459; 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 97 (1975). While modifications that can only
benefit a surety do not discharge a surety generally, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SEC.
§ 128(a) (1941), and while discharge of compensated sureties requires proof of preju-
dice, see, e.g., id. § 128(b), the court's use of these authorities to establish a general
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declared by the court thus was at variance with section 128 of
the Restatement of Security, which allows discharge of an un-
compensated surety, such as Pratt, for any modification that is
not of the type that necessarily would benefit Pratt. 1'
In a final twist, the court declared that, if a prejudicial alter-
ation had been made after Pratt's assignment, presumably with
the Rosenbergs' acquiescence, then a novation by conduct might
have resulted; hence, a novation argument might have dis-
charged Pratt.212 The court stated:
If the changes in the obligation prejudicially affect the
assignor, a new agreement has been formed between the
assignee and the other original contracting party More con-
cisely, a novation has occurred and the assignor's original
obligation has been discharged. This is consistent with our
previous decisions and statutory authority Although we
have previously determined that the terms of the assign-
ment agreement between Pratt and Son, Inc., did not con-
template a novation, there are additional methods of malng
a novation besides doing so in the express terms of an
agreement." 3
The court went on to state that "[the question of whether or
not there has been a novation is a question of fact."21 4 The
court, therefore, remanded the case for fact-finding on whether
Pratt was discharged by novationY.2 5 After a hearing on re-
mand in which the trial judge did not find a novation, Pratt
settled with the Rosenbergs for several thousand dollars.1 6
rule is questionable.
211. See supra part III.B.2.
212. See Rosenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 77.
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 78.
215. Id.
216. Shirley A. Dvorak, Pratt's attorney of record in Rosenberg, furmshed the fol-
lowing summation of events:
This matter was initially commenced by Rosenberg against Pratt and a
company known as Son, Inc., successor m interest to Pratt in the Dairy
Queen. Pratt and Rosenberg both made cross motions for summary judg-
ment. The initial motions were both denied, but on the second motion for
summary judgment of dismissal by Pratt, the trial Court [sic] concurred
and granted Mrs. Pratt's motion for summary judgment. That dismissal
by summary judgment was appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court
1352
PRIVILEGES OF SURETYSHIP
The court did not resort to the Restatement of Security Obvi-
ously, the North Dakota Supreme Court is free to use or to dis-
regard the Restatement or any of its rules. The failure to use
section 128 is thus hardly a ground for criticism. Likewise, the
court cannot fairly be faulted for reqmring proof of a prejudical
change, rather than any change, as a grounds for discharge. 17
The opinion is subject to criticism, however, on two points.
First, in rejecting the claim that Pratt was a surety in relation
to the Rosenbergs, the decision undercuts the meaning of
nonconsensual suretyship and runs contrary to prevailing
law 218 Second, the opinion is illogical insofar as it denied Pratt
suretyship status in relation to the Rosenbergs but implied that
a prejudical postdelegation change in the contractual obligation
would discharge Pratt, even if it fell short of a novation.219 In
short, the opinion seems to demonstrate fundamental confusion
about the meaning and purpose of nonconsensual suretyship.
In the sole reported delegation case citing UCC section 2-
210 in which nonconsensual suretyship and its possible bene-
fits to the surety were recognized, the nonconsensual surety
thus did not gain discharge on the facts.22 Moreover, the law
in this area seems somewhat muddled, perhaps for lack of any
cross-reference to the Restatement of Security and its system-
atic statement of the discharge rules. The fact pattern present-
ed in Rosenberg and the twists and turns of that case's opin-
ion call for a clarification of the intersection of suretyship law
and delegation.
by Rosenberg. The Supreme Court reversed The matter was then
tried to the same trial judge. In light of the Supreme Court's holdings,
he felt he had no choice but to find in favor of [the] Rosenbergs, and
against Pratt, in the sum of $27,839.59 plus costs and disbursements. In
September, 1993, Mrs. Pratt settled all clans with [the] Rosenbergs by
mutual release for the sum of $8,500.
Letter from Shirley A. Dvorak, Pratt's attorney of record in Rosenberg, to Gary L.
Monserud, Professor of Law, New England School of Law (Feb. 13, 1996) (on file
with Author) (quoted with Ms. Dvorak's permission).
217. This is the modern trend. See infra part V
218. See supra part II.C.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
220. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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C. Selected Delegation Cases Arising Under Section 2-210
Given the dearth of case law and the fact that the North Da-
kota Supreme Court was not inclined to apply principles from
the Restatement of Security,22' one might conclude that, even
though the law of delegation under section 2-210 and the rules
of nonconsensual suretyship incorporated into the Restatement
of Security have coexisted since the UCC's promulgation in the
1950s, the two are seldom, if ever, woven together. From the
case reports, this is a reasonable inference about the develop-
ment of the law The lack of case law blending nonconsensual
suretyship from the Restatement with section 2-210 does not,
however, establish that suretyship issues are absent from com-
mercial settings in which delegations of Article 2 obligations
have been made. Quite possibly, in delegation cases, lawyers are
not discermng suretyship defenses when the facts would allow
them. Whether this is true is a matter of conjecture because no
empirical study indicates whether practicing lawyers tend to
bypass defenses involving this relatively obscure doctrine of
commercial law
On the assumption that suretyship defenses may, on occasion,
be bypassed or poorly understood, this section will further ex-
pose the necessary commingling of rules of suretyship law from
the 1941 Restatement with the rules of delegation under section
2-210. This effort requires two steps: first, the section will dis-
cuss three cases citing section 2-210; and second, with slight
adjustments to the fact patterns, this section will apply the rules
of suretyship from the Restatement, demonstrating that sure-
tyship defenses often lie close at hand in representative fact
patterns. The underlying assumption is that the delegating
party under section 2-210 becomes a nonconsensual surety as a
matter of law in the absence of a novation. This exercise is,
therefore, an attempt to creatively weave two strands of law
that are seldom woven together.
221. See supra part IV.B. In view of North Dakota statutory provisions, see supra
text accompanying note 201, the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision not to ap-
ply principles from the Restatement of Security is quite understandable.
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1. Tarter v MonArk Boat Co. 2 2
Roy Tarter made a contract with MonArk Boat Co. (MonArk)
for the construction and delivery of a custom-built houseboat in
return for a promised purchase price of $1 6 0, 0 0 0.2' The con-
tract contained an express six-month warranty on workmanship
and materials. 2' After the contract had been signed and con-
struction commenced, MonArk asszgned the contract to
AlumaShip, Inc. (AlumaShip), who "assumed all responsibility
thereunder," which meant that there was a delegation of duties
as well as an assignment of rights.2" By agreement of the con-
tracting parties, the contract was governed by Article 2 as adopt-
ed in Arkansas. 6
Tarter learned of the assignment and delegation when a work-
er phoned and informed him of it. 227 Tarter paid MonArk
$128,000 on the purchase price, and he later paid the remaining
222. 430 F Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affd, 574 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978).
223. Id. at 1291-92. The written contract included drawings, parts lists, and a de-
tailed description' of items to be included in the construction of the boat. Id. at
1291.
224. Id. The disclaimer failed to mention merchantability and was therefore inef-
fective under the state statute parallel to UCC § 2-316(1)(2) to disclaun that warran-
ty. Id& at 1294.
225. Id. at 1291-92. The corporate machinations by which the assignment was com-
pleted are confusing. The court's findings of fact state:
On July 13, 1973, by a stock purchase agreement, MonArk sold to
Star Enterprises, Limited the stock of MonArk Shipyards, Inc. and the
name was changed to SteelShip, Inc. As part of this sale, Star Enter-
prises, Limited, acquired the stock of MonArk Custom Craft, Inc. which
was renamed AlumaSiup, Inc.
Pursuant to this sale, the contract with [Tarter] was assigned
to AlumaSip.
Id. The opinion, however, never explains how MonArk Custom Craft, Inc., the as-
signor, acquired the contract that was made by MonArk Boat Co. Nevertheless,
whether there was a prior assignment is irrelevant because AlumaShip, Inc. was an
assignee who "assumed all responsibility" for building Tarter's houseboat. Id. at
1292.
226. Id. at 1293 (stating that, in the contract, the parties agreed that Arkansas
law would control). The specially manufactured boat brought the case within
Arkansas's state analog to UCC Article 2. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-2-102, -105(1)
(Michie 1987). Section 4-2-105(1) states in relevant part: "'Goods' means all things
(including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid. " Id. § 4-2-105(1).
227. Tarter, 430 F Supp. at 1292.
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balance to AlumaShnp.225 When Tarter took delivery and found
the boat to be deficient in many respects, he notified both
AlumaShip and MonArk of the deficiencies.229 Representatives
of MonArk and AlumaShnp met with Tarter to work out a solu-
tion, but the effort failed. As a result, Tarter sued MonArk for
breach of warranty 230
MonArk offered as a defense that it had delegated its obliga-
tions by assigmng its contract to AlumaShip; accordingly, it had
absolved itself of any obligations to Tarter."3 ' The court
squelched the argument with a quotation from Arkansas's sec-
tion 2-210(1): "No delegation of performance relieves the party
delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach." 2
Of course, a novation could have relieved MonArk, but MonArk
had the burden of proving a novation "so 'as to leave no room for
doubt.' 22 The court found that MonArk failed to meet this
burden.234 MonArk thus was liable to Tarter for direct damag-
es in the form of repair costs and incidental damages. 5
MonArk did not seek discharge on suretyship principles and,
on the reported facts, had no bona fide argument for discharge
when the novation argument failed. 6 On the foregoing fact
pattern, however, one can easily construct a suretyship defense
with a slight adjustment of the facts and the use of principles
borrowed from the Restatement of Security Consider Restate-
ment section 128, which pertains to modifications of a principal's
228. Id. Tarter paid AlumaShip through an escrow agent and under an indemnity
agreement whereby AlumaSlup's parent corporation agreed to indemnify Tarter for
any claims by MonArk. Id.
229. Id. at 1293. Evidence showed that repairs would cost approximately $37,000.
Id. Tarter also "testified that the boat would have had a value of $160,000 had it
been as warranted" and that it had a value of only $80,000 m its defective condi-
tion. Id. at 1294. The judge, however, did not find Tarter's testimony credible for
calculating damages. Id. The judge chose to use the cost of repair, $37,000, as the
measure of damages for the defendant's breach of warranties. Id. at 1295.
230. Id. at 1292-93.
231. Id. at 1293.
232. Id. (quoting ARK. STAT. § 85-2-210(1)).
233. Id. (quoting Alston v. Bitely, 477 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Ark. 1972)); see supra note
10 (discussing and defining a novation).
234. Tarter, 430 F Supp. at 1294.
235. Id. at 1295.
236. See id. at 1291-95. The novation argument can arse in suretyship cases, but
it is not itself a suretyship defense. See supra note 10.
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duty 7 Suppose that, after the worker phoned Tarter and ad-
vised him of the contractual assignment, which was both an
assignment and a delegation, Tarter visited the AlumaShip
yards to complain about dealing with strangers with whom he
had not contracted. Suppose also that, in an effort to pacify him,
AlumaSip's agent negotiated a modest design change en-
hancing the aesthetics of the houseboat without any change in
contract pricey 8 Suppose further that, in accordance with the
facts as reported, the boat was deficient; however, each deficien-
cy derived from workmanship done by AlumaShip pursuant to
the original plans. The enhancements involved no deficiencies.
What would have been the inpact on MonArk if a design
modification had been made without its consent and the 1941
Restatement were applied? The correct analysis turns on the ar-
rangement of the parties in terms of suretyship obligations.
When MonArk delegated its obligations to AlumaShip, it became
a surety and AlumaShip became the principal obligor. When
Tarter (obligee) was advised of the delegation, he was bound to
respect MonArk's suretyship status regardless of whether he
agreed to the delegation. Pursuant to section 128 of the 1941
Restatement, "the surety is discharged unless the modifica-
tion is of a sort that can only be beneficial to the surety ""
The design changes that enhanced aesthetics were not necessari-
ly beneficial to MonArk."0 As a result, under Restatement sec-
tion 128, MonArk rightly could claim complete discharge due to
the modification without its consent. Fair or not, this would be
the correct result using suretyship princilles drawn from the
Restatement of Security This result demonstrates that, while
MonArk's lawyer was wrong in arguing that the delegation itself
effected MonArk's discharge, a sound argument could have been
constructed if the dealings between Tarter and AlumaShip re-
237. See supra part III.B.2.
238. Under § 2-209(i), a modification is binding even without fresh consideration.
U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1994). The hypothetical assumes the requisite writing. See zd. § 2-
209.
239. RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128(a) (1941).
240. What would necessarily have been beneficial to MonArk in this case is dif-
ficult to discern. Probably, a simplification of the plans eliminating a complexity of
construction with no attendant price reduction would qualify.
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sulted in modification. This is not to suggest that MonArk's
lawyer erred; the argument is merely that a suretyship defense
may lurk in the shadows when a delegation of performance is
made, especially in a complex contract.
2. Tennell v Esteve Cotton Co."'
H.S. Tennell, a Texas cotton farmer, agreed to sell to Gant
Cooley Cotton Co. (Gant Cooley) his cotton production on a
designated 120 acres, estimated to be 100 bales. 2 The con-
tract price vaned depending on the cotton's quality 3 Before
the cotton was fully grown, Gant Cooley assigned the contract,
thus delegating the obligation of payment, to Esteve Cotton
Co. (Esteve).2" At harvest time, when the market price had
risen to approximately double the contract price, Tennell de-
livered forty-nine bales to Esteve but refused to deliver the
remaining cotton grown on the designated acreage. 5 Esteve
sued for damages, pleading alternatively for damages mea-
sured by the contract and cover or the contract and market
price differential.246
Tennell defended on several theories, but Esteve won at tri-
al." 7 On appeal, Tennell contended that Esteve's failure to give
timely notice of the contract's assignment was a repudiation of
the contract that entitled Tennell to suspend performance.248
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals gave the argument short
shrift, stating that, while section 2-210(5) allowed Tennell to
treat the delegation as grounds for insecurity under section 2-
241. 546 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
242. Id. at 349. At all times, Gant Cooley acted through its authorized agent, Clar-
ence Young, a cotton buyer. See id.
243. Id. at 349-50.
244. Id. at 349.
245. Id. at 350.
246. Id. at 351; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-712, -713 (1994) (authorizing Esteve's claimed
damages).
247. Tennell, 546 S.W.2d at 351.
248. Id. at 354 n.4.
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609," 9 the delegation was not an automatic repudiation."
Furthermore, Esteve had no obligation to provide assurances of
performance unless assurances were demanded in accordance
with section 2-609Y As a matter of law, Tennell had no de-
fense based on the fact of the delegation itself. 2 The court
noted especially that Gant Cooley remained liable for payment
despite the assignment and delegation. 3 The trial court's
judgment in favor of Esteve was sustainedY4
Tennell raised no suretyship issues, and the reported fact
pattern provided none. 5 Suppose, however, that, at the time
of delivery, the price of cotton had decreased by half rather than
doubled, so that the price Esteve was obligated to pay under the
assigned contract was double the market value of the cotton. In
this context, Tennell would have been eager to deliver, and
Esteve would have been reluctant to pay Suppose Esteve and
Tennell negotiated an extension of the payment date, so that
payment for the less-valuable-than-expected cotton was extended
over a year instead of being due on delivery, and that this pay-
ment schedule was made without approval of or reservation of
rights against Gant Cooley Market conditions could readily
249. The controlling law for the case technically was not the UCC; it was the ver-
sion of the UCC adopted in Texas. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.210(e),
.609 (Vernon 1968).
250. Tennell, 546 S.W.2d at 354 n.4.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 352 n.3. The court stated:
Tennell has not pointed to any circumstance in the transaction or to
any evidence m the record to show that the assignment falls within one
of the exceptions. He merely asks upon whom he would have demanded
performance had the market price of cotton fallen below the contract
price, and then he argues that, because he did not know about Esteve,
his chance of return performance was materially impaired. The brief
answer is that Tennell's chance of return performance could not be ma-
terially impaired by the mere addition of a party to whom he could
look for performance, for, although by virtue of the assignment Esteve
became obligated for the contractual performance of Gant Cooley, the
latter was not thereby relieved of its contractual obligation if Esteve
failed to perform.
Id.
254. Id. at 359. The court, however, made minor adjustments in the award. Id.
255. Id. at 349-51.
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generate such a course of events.
On these suppositions, if Esteve defaulted, the question arises
whether Gant Cooley would have remained liable to Tennell for
the price of the cotton. The case must be considered in surety-
ship terms. Tennell was a creditor or obligee, Esteve became the
principal obligor obliged to pay for the cotton under the contract,
and Gant Cooley became the nonconsensual surety Under sec-
tion 129 of the Restatement of Security, if the principal and
creditor make a binding agreement to extend the time for pay-
ment without a reservation of rights or the surety's consent, the
surety is discharged in toto 6 By straightforward application
of this rule, Tennell would have lost all rights against Gant
Cooley by agreeing to the payment time extension. In the re-
ported case, of course, the parties made no such extension agree-
ment. The cotton market put the seller, not the buyer, in a dis-
tressful situation, and the seller breached by nondeliverym 7
Nonetheless, suretyship issues lurk nearby whenever a buyer
delegates a duty to pay and there is postdelegation stress in the
relationship that leads to contractual adjustments.
3. McKinnie v Milford 58
C.W Milford sold a stallion to Norman Stewart, who agreed
to allow Milford to use the horse for breeding purposes twice a
year for as long as the stallion livedY9 Stewart complied im-
tially but then reneged and sold the horse to McKinme, who
took title to the horse with knowledge of Milford's contractual
right to use the horse for breeding purposes.26 By selling the
stallion to McKinme, Stewart delegated a duty, namely, the duty
to make the stallion available for Milford's use. McKinme re-
fused to comply with that duty 2. Milford sued Stewart and
McKinme for damages and recovered at trial based on a jury
verdict."2
256. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 129(1) (1941). Of course, the rule is different for
a compensated surety. Id. § 129(2); see supra part III.B.3.
257. Tennell, 546 S.W.2d at 349.
258. 597 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
259. Id. at 955.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Stewart and McKinme defended on the theory that their obligation to fur-
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McKinme argued on appeal, inter alia, that the judgment
against him was erroneous because he owed no obligation to
Milford, as he was a stranger to the original contract and there
was insufficient evidence to prove an assumption of contractual
obligations from Stewart.2" The court rejected this combina-
tion of arguments with a citation to section 2-210(4),2" which
provides that, unless the language of an assignment or other
circumstances indicate to the contrary, an assignment of "the
contract" includes a delegation of duties.265 In the case sub ju-
dice, McKinme's purchase gave him title to the horse with the
attendant duty to make the horse available to Milford for breed-
ing purposes."' Undertalng the duty to make the horse avail-
able to Milford was alkn to buying a good and assuming a debt
obligation as part of the consideration paid.267 Because the re-
cord indicated McKinme's assumption of this obligation, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed."
McKinnze raised no suretyship issues, and none were appar-
ent in the facts as reported. Suppose, however, that Stewart was
already liable for damages at the time of the sale to McKinme
for failing to deliver the horse for breeding purposes under the
original agreement. Suppose further that, as part of the pur-
chase price, McKinme promised to pay off any liability owing to
Milford for Stewart's breach, an amount estimated at $1000.
Finally, suppose that, when Milford was informed of the terms
of McKinme's purchase, for old friendship's sake and because he
believed McKinme would honor his contractual obligations in
the future, he decided to release McKinme from any liability for
Stewart's breaches for the modest sum of $100, intending to sue
Stewart for damages.
Would Milford still have had a claim against Stewart for any
nish the stud was suspended because Milford owed Stewart money for veterinary
services and board. The jury found that Milford did not owe Stewart money and
thereby laid this defense to rest. Id
263. Id. at 956. Stewart did not appeal. Id. at 955.
264. Id. at 957 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210(d) (Vernon 1968)).
265. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210(d) (Vernon 1968).
266. McKinne, 597 S.W.2d at 956.
267. Id. at 958.
268. Id.
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of the damages incurred due to Stewart's breach before the sale?
On these assumed facts, the 1941 Restatement is not helpful to
Milford. Under the hypothetical, in suretyship terms, Stewart
became a surety and McKinme became the principal obligor as
to liability for Stewart's breach. The obligee or creditor to whom
the obligation was owed was Milford. When Milford struck the
deal with McKinme for the $100 cash payment, thereby releas-
ing McKinme from his assumed obligation, under the rule con-
tained in section 122 of the Restatement of Security, Stewart
also was released because Milford neither reserved rights nor
procured Stewart's consent to the release. The privileges of
nonconsensual suretyship would, therefore, drive a court toward
exonerating Stewart because of Milford's miscalculated, though
good faith, release of McKinnie.
D. Summary
While it seems as if principles of nonconsensual suretyship
and the rules of delegation under section 2-210 of the UCC have
been combined in only one reported case,"' in wich, it should
be noted, the court did not use the Restatement of Security, the
practical importance of discermng the intersection of delegation
and nonconsensual suretyship is readily apparent. As previously
illustrated through use of adjusted fact patterns from the report-
ed delegation cases, release of the delegate, an extension of time
for payment, or any other alteration of the delegate's duties can
lead to immediate discharge of the delegating party, who occu-
pies the position of nonconsensual surety To be sure, the fre-
quency of postdelegation dealings between the delegate and the
obligee (creditor) remains a matter of speculation in the absence
of field studies.270 Nonetheless, given the hundreds of billions
of dollars involved in exchanges of goods in any given year, the
absence of postdelegation marketplace conduct sufficient to trig-
ger suretyship defenses seems very unlikely
269. Rosenberg v. Son, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1992).
270. Undertaking a study on a scale sufficient to generate reliable data might be
impractical or even impossible.
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V CHANGES IN SURETYSHIP LAW UNDER THE RESTATEMENT OF
SURETYSHI
Thus far, this Article has discussed delegation cases, which
are reported under UCC section 2-210, and has borrowed surety-
ship principles from the Restatement of Security to demonstrate
how suretyship law and ordinary delegations can intersect. In
this section, the Article will examine the changes made in sure-
tyship law in the new Restatement of Suretyship approved by
the American Law Institute in 1995.271
Generally, nonconsensual sureties are less privileged under
the Restatement of Suretyship than under the Restatement of
Security This result is not because nonconsensual sureties are
singled out for bad treatment. It is simply a consequence of
changes made in the rules for discharge that apply to all sure-
ties, nonconsensual sureties included. This part of the Article
will first discuss the recognition of nonconsensual suretyship in
the new Restatement. This discussion will be followed by an
overview of suretyship defenses. This Article will next discuss
three new discharge rules: those dealing with release of a princi-
pal, those dealing with time extensions, and those dealing with
modifications other than time extensions. Hence, this discussion
parallels the discussion of discharge rules under the 1941 Re-
statement of Security contained in Part III of this Article.
In discussing the Restatement of Suretyship, this Article will
use a slight shift in terminology from that used in the Re-
statement of Security The Restatement of Suretyship avoids
using the term "surety" and generally substitutes the term "sec-
ondary obligor." 2 Accordingly, the term "secondary obligor"
will be used instead of "surety," and the term "creditor" will be
replaced by "obligee," in an effort to make the discussion con-
sistent with the language of the new Restatement.7 3
271. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. (1995).
272. Id. § 1 cmt. d.
273. Id.
1996] 1363
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1307
A. Recognition of Nonconsensual Suretyship Under the
Restatement (Thzrd) of Suretyship
What this Article has called nonconsensual suretyship is rec-
ognized in section 2, paragraph e, of the new Restatement,
which provides that suretyship status is attained "by contract
between an obligor and another person pursuant to which, with-
out a novation, the other person assumes a duty of the obligor to
the obligee, with the result that the other person becomes the
principal obligor and the original obligor becomes the secondary
obligor."274
Clearly, paragraph e of section 2, quoted above, recognizes the
status of nonconsensual suretyship. The reporter's note following
section 2 cites section 83 of the Restatement of Security as its
source.2 7' The comment to paragraph e confirms an interpre-
tation that recognizes nonconsensual suretyship as a special
type of relationship covered by the Restatement.7
Illustration 3 following the comment sets forth the traditional
scenario:
S owns Blackacre, an item of real estate worth approxi-
mately $500,000, subject to a mortgage debt of $300,000. S
transfers Blackacre to P in exchange for $200,000 and P's
assumption of the mortgage debt. By the assumption of the
mortgage debt, P is the principal obligor and S is the second-
ary obligor.2 77
This illustration is in perfect harmony with Unmon Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hanford.278 Moreover, the reporter's note,
274. Id. § 2(e).
275. Id. § 2 reporter's note.
276. The comment states:
When another person assumes a contractual duty of an obligor, both
that person and the original obligor are liable to the obligee. As between
the person that assumed the obligation and the original obligor, the per-
son that assumed the obligation has a duty to perform. Therefore, as a
result of the assumption contract, the third person becomes a principal
obligor and the original obligor becomes a secondary obligor with surety-
ship status.
Id. § 2 cmt. e.
277. Id. § 2 illus. 3.
278. 143 U.S. 187 (1892); see supra part II.A (discussing Hanford).
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in its sources for the comment to paragraph e, cites, inter alia,
Twombley v. Wulf279 Twombley arose from the sale of a busi-
ness in which a taxi cab was sold subject to a security inter-
est.28 By implication, therefore, section 2(e) recognizes that
nonconsensual suretyship can arise in sales of goods, as well as
in sales of real estate.2 1 This recognition of the status of
nonconsensual suretyship in sales of both goods and real estate
must now be matched with the substantive rules in sections 39,
40, and 41 and the procedural rules of section 49 to ascertain
the legal impact of nonconsensual suretyship under the new
Restatement. First, however, an examination of the jurispruden-
tial viewpoint underlying the discharge rules is warranted.
B. An Introduction to Suretyship Defenses Under the New
Restatement
1. A Change in the Underlying Jurisprudential Viewpoint
As discussed in Parts II and III, under the common law and
the Restatement of Security, the doctrine of strictissimi juris
played a major role in protecting uncompensated secondary
obligors against dealings between the principal obligors and
obligees to which secondary obligors did not consent. The new
Restatement contains a fundamental shift in jurisprudential
viewpoint in the section entitled "Suretyship Defenses."282 Al-
though the secondary obligor is furnished with an impressive
defensive arsensal, stnctzssmi juris no longer provides the iron-
clad defenses afforded at common law or in the old Restatement.
The introductory note preceding section 37 explains the rea-
sons for the changes in suretyship defenses wrought by the new
RestatementY.2 ' The changes are based upon the fact that a
279. 482 P.2d 166 (Or. 1971); see supra part III.C.1 (discussing Twombley).
280. Twombley, 482 P.2d at 167.
281. This fact can also reasonably be inferred from illustration 2, which states: "S
Corporation sells all of its assets to P, who pays $1,000,000 and agrees to assume
all of S Corporation's liabilities. With respect to each liability of S Corporation, P is
the principal obligor and S Corporation is the secondary obligor." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 2 illus. 2. Of course, the assets sold by S to P
could be goods, real estate, intangibles, or any combination thereof.
282. See id. §§ 37-49.
283. Id. tit. B, introductory note.
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secondary obligor undertakes two distinct economic risks: (1) the
risk that the principal obligor will not perform and (2) the risk
that the secondary obligor will be unable to pass its cost of per-
formance to the principal obligor.2 These risks can be in-
creased by acts of the obligee. The Restatement therefore adopts
the general principle that, in the absence of the secondary
obligor's agreement to the contrary, Title B, which includes the
suretyship defenses, "discharges a secondary obligor to the ex-
tent that such [obligee's] acts would otherwise cause the second-
ary obligor to suffer a loss. "128 The words "to the extent" are
key The rules for discharge generally allow discharge pro tanto,
meaning to the extent that an obligee's act actually causes eco-
nomic detriment to a secondary obligor. Nonetheless, some obli-
gee acts can so fundamentally alter the secondary obligor's risks
that total discharge is justified.
The Restatement explains the different grounds for complete
discharge.286 Specifically, section 37(2) sets forth two grounds
for complete discharge:
(2) If the obligee fundamentally alters the risks imposed on
the secondary obligor by-
(a) releasing the principal obligor from a duty other than
the payment of money (§ 39(c)(iii)); or
(b) agreeing to a modification of the duties of the principal
obligor that either amounts to a substituted contract or im-
poses risks on the secondary obligor fundamentally different
from those imposed on the secondary obligor prior to modifi-
cation (§ 41(b)(i));
the secondary obligor is discharged from any unperformed
portion of the secondary obligation as more fully set forth in
those sections.287
In plain language, the new Restatement thus isolates two
situations for special treatment. In the first situation, an obligee
in the underlying contract is entitled to a performance other
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. § 37(2)-(3).
287. Id. § 37(2)(a)-(b).
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than the payment of money ' For example, an obligee (buyer)
may have contracted to purchase commodities, and the second-
ary obligor may have undertaken the risk that the principal
obligor (seller) would not deliver. In this case, the obligee's re-
lease of the seller would foist upon the secondary obligor the
duty to perform a nonmonetary obligation, which would be diffi-
cult to quantify, at least in advance of the release.289 Moreover,
the obligee's release of the principal obligor in this situation is
not a risk for which a secondary obligor normally bargains.Y9
As a result, there is complete discharge.
The second situation, congidered in section 37(2)(b), is
similiar. When an obligee and principal obligor fundamentally
change the nature of the underlying contract or substitute a new
contract, the secondary obligor is discharged.29' For example, if
the underlying contract provided that the principal obligor
should deliver wheat and, by modification, the principal obligor's
duty was changed to require the delivery of soybeans, the risk of
nonperformance of the substituted obligation clearly was not a
risk for which the secondary obligor bargained. Complete dis-
charge therefore follows.
Section 37(3)(a)-(c) sets forth three grounds for pro tanto
discharge:
(3) If the obligee impairs the secondary obligor's recourse
against the principal obligor by-
(a) releasing the principal obligor from a duty to pay
money (§ 39(c)(ii));
(b) granting the principal obligor an extension of time for
performance of its duties pursuant to the underlying obli-
gation (§ 40(b)); [or]
(c) agreeing to a modification of the duties of the princi-
pal obligor, other than a release or an extension of time, that
does not amount to a substituted contract or impose risks on
the secondary obligor fundamentally different from those
nposed on the secondary obligor prior to modification (§ 41(bXii))
288. Id. § 37(2)(a).
289. See id. § 39 cmt. g.
290. See td. § 37 cmt. a.
291. Id. § 37(2)(b).
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the secondary obligor is discharged from its duties pursuant
to the secondary obligation to the extent set forth in these
sections 292
According to this language, a release from an obligation to pay
money, an extension of time in which to perform any obligation,
or a less-than-fundamental modification of the underlying obli-
gation leads to discharge by degrees. The Restatement thus
takes a bifurcated approach:2 11 major modifications substan-
tially changing a secondary obligor's risks result in complete dis-
charge, but lesser modifications are treated simply as a breach
of the obligee's duty toward the secondary obligor, resulting m
discharge to the extent of the harm, if any, caused by the
obligee's act.294 Sections 39 through 49 fine tune the applica-
tion of these principles. 5
The results in situations in which an obligee acts to the detri-
ment of a secondary obligor turn on the nature of the obligee's
292. Id. § 37(3)(a)-(c). The remainder of § 37(3) covers other reasons for which
discharge nght occur, see id. § 37(3)(d)-(f), all of which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
293. As the comments to § 37 state:
This Restatement adopts a bifurcated approach to impairments of
the secondary obligor's suretyship status. When the impairment funda-
mentally alters the risks imposed on the secondary obligor, the resulting
situation is no longer that for wich the secondary obligor bargained.
Accordingly, the secondary obligor is discharged from its obligation. When
the consequences of the impairment are only a potential increase in cost
of performance not capable of being shifted to the principal obligor,
though, the obligee's act is treated as a breach of a duty not to impair
that recourse, and this Restatement adopts the view espoused m U.C.C.
§ 1-106 that an aggrieved party's remedy should put that party in as
good a position, but not a better one, as would have been the case if the
other party had not impaired the aggrieved party's rights.
Id. § 37 cmt. a.
294. Id.
295. See id. §§ 39-49. The comments to § 37 further state:
Accordingly, in those cases, this section and §§ 39-44 provide rules dis-
charging the secondary obligor from liability on the secondary obligation
to the extent that the impairment of recourse would otherwise prejudice
the secondary obligor, and providing for recovery from the obligee if the
loss has already occurred because the secondary obligation has been
performed.
Id. § 37 cmt. a.
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act2 " rather than on the classification of the secondary obligor
as compensated or uncompensated, which was the case under
the Restatement of Security29 The allocation of the burden of
persuasion when suretyship defenses are raised turns, however,
upon the purpose for which the secondary obligor became obli-
gated, which is discussed in section 49.29' Moreover, the sec-
ondary obligor may waive its suretyship defenses,299 and,
under certain circumtances, an obligee may effect a preservation
of the secondary obligor's recourse against the principal obligor,
thereby preventing or dminmshing by degrees the extent of the
secondary obligor's discharge."'
In sum, the jurisprudential viewpoint espoused in section 37
and its comments is a viewpoint rooted in a hard; practical anal-
ysis of risks assumed by secondary obligors. It is a viewpoint
that tries to pull the law into harmony with realistic economic
expectations in concrete situations. The distinctions made in the
sections stating the defenses are based upon assessments of the
extent to which an obligee's act increases a secondary obligor's
risk of loss. An obligee's acts that generally lead to substantial
loss have harsh consequences; obligees' acts giving rise to slight-
ly increased risks or lesser losses have lesser consequences. The
rules are designed to avoid granting secondary obligors windfalls
resulting from minor alterations in the underlying contract,
which was often the case under the rule of stnctrssimi juns, in
which the relief given to the secondary obligors "often exceeded
any harm caused by the obligee's acts."301
296. See id. § 37 cmt. a.
297. See id.
298. See infra part V.B.3.
299. As the introductory note to Title B states:
Generally speaking, m the absence of the secondary obligor's agreement
to the contrary, this Title discharges a secondary obligor to the extent
that such acts would otherwise cause the secondary obligor to suffer a
loss. It should be noted however, that agreement to the contrary, espe-
cially in form of consent to such an act or waiver of discharge resulting
from such act, is common in many contexts.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. tit. B, introductory note.
300. See id. § 38; infra part V.B.2.
301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 37 cmt. a. The comment
states in full:
As time passed, courts became unsatisfied with a rigid application of this
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2. Preservation of the Secondary Obligor's Recourse
The new Restatement discards the traditional reservation-of-
rights doctrine."0 2 A leaner and more modern approach has
taken its place, stating:
(1) When an obligee releases the principal from, or
agrees to extend the time for performance of, a duty to pay
money pursuant to the underlying obligation, the release or
extension effects a "preservation of the secondary obligor's
recourse" with respect to that duty if the express terms of the
release or extension provide that:
(a) the obligee retains the right to seek performance of
the secondary obligation by the secondary obligor; and
(b) the rights of the secondary obligor to recourse
against the principal obligor (§§ 21-31) continue as though
the release or extension had not been granted.
(2) When the obligee effects a preservation of the second-
ary obligor's recourse in conjunction with a release or exten-
sion, the principal obligor's duties of performance and reim-
bursement and the secondary obligor's rights of restitution
and subrogation continue as though the release or extension
did not occur. °3
Notably, this preservation-of-recourse doctrine does not per-
tain to modifications other than time extensions; moreover, it
pertains only to releases and time extensions when the principal
obligor's pronse is to pay money Tins section forces upon the
obligee an obligation to be forthright because the extension or
doctrine, often referred to as strictisstmt juns. The problem was that
rigid application of the doctrine resulted in secondary obligors being dis-
charged from substantial secondary obligations because of minor, nmnate-
rial changes in the relationship between the principal obligor and the
obligee. Consequently, application of the doctrine often resulted m wind-
falls for these secondary obligors in that the relief provided by the doc-
trine often exceeded any harm caused by the obligee's acts.
Id.
302. See id. § 38 cmt. a (stating that "this Restatement adopts the modern view
that the traditional reservation of rights doctrine has outlived whatever usefulness it
may have had. Therefore, the rules in this Restatement do not allow the obligee to
prevent the discharge of the secondary obligor merely by reserving rights against the
secondary obligor.").
303. Id. § 38.
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release must explicitly state two things: (1) that the obligee is
retaimng rights against the secondary obligor and (2) that the
secondary obligor's rights against the principal obligor will con-
tinue as if the release or extension had not been granted. The
unsophisticated principal obligor thus will not be surprised after
a release or extension by a claim for reimbursement from the
secondary obligor.0 4
Illustration 1 following section 38 shows the operation of this
section in the case of a release."5 According to the illustration,
the principal obligor owes $1000 to the obligee. The obligee finds
that the principal obligor is facing bankruptcy and therefore col-
lects $100 in return for a release of the principal obligor. This
release is made with an express preservation of rights in accord
with section 38. Consequently, the obligee can pursue the sec-
ondary obligor for $900."'0 The preservation-of-rights mecha-
nism has allowed release of the principal obligor without release
of the secondary obligor. The secondary obligor has suffered "no
loss flowing from unavailability of claims against [the principal
obligor] because those claims continue as though the release
had not been granted.""0 7 Notice to the secondary obligor is not
required.8 "
Section 38, however, must be blended with section 37(3),
which provides for pro tanto discharge caused by an obligee's
acts. Even with a preservation of the secondary obligor's rights
against the principal obligor, the principal obligor's release quite
possibly will induce conduct detrimental to the secondary obli-
gor. Release of a debt nnght induce a principal obligor to work
less, earn less, or otherwise dispose of assets. Such a result
would prejudice the secondary obligor to the extent that the
likelihood of reimbursement was reduced. Notice to the second-
ary obligor therefore is the recommended practice when a re-
lease or time extension is granted because the secondary obligor
304. See td. § 38 cmt. a ("Thus, the preservation of recourse prevents loss to the
secondary obligor that would otherwise result from obviation of the principal obligor's
duty to the secondary obligor without causing the principal obligor unfair surprise.").
305. Id. § 38 illus. 1.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. § 38 cmt. b.
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will then have the knowledge and incentive to insist upon re-
sponsible behavior by the principal obligor..3 " Notice is impor-
tant because, while preservation of rights under section 38 oper-
ates to prevent discharge of both an obligee's claim against a
secondary obligor and the secondary obligor's claim against the
principal obligor solely on account of a release or extension, the
secondary obligor may nonetheless raise as a defense the exten-
sion or discharge to the extent it has caused actual loss. 3 0 No-
tice from the obligee to the secondary obligor of an extension or
release and an accompanying preservation of rights may extin-
guish or dinnmsh any causal connection between a secondary
obligor's loss and obligee's act.
Nothing in section 38 or its comments states explicitly that
the preservation-of-rghts doctrine pertains to situations involv-
ing nonconsensual suretyship. Logically, however, because the
nonconsensual surety is a special kind of secondary obligor who
gains important privileges by operation of law, a nonconsensual
surety should be subject to the normal limitations on its prvi-
leges. The text provides no good reason nor is there any policy
reason to cast away the reservation-of-rights doctrine in connec-
tion with nonconsensual suretyship. Because nonconsensual
suretyship is not often recognized when delegations are made
under Article 2 contracts, however, frequent use of this mecha-
nism in these situations is very unlikely
3. Burden of Persuasion with Respect to Impairment of
Recourse
Clearly, many cases are won or lost depending upon the allo-
cation of burdens that litigants must carry at trial. Section 49
309. The comments to § 38 state:
If the secondary obligor first learns of an extension or release (and the
accompanying preservation of recourse) a significant time later, the pas-
sage of time may rob the secondary obligor's recourse of any practical
value if the principal obligor's ability to perform has degenerated during
that time. If, on the other hand, the obligee informs the secondary obli-
gor promptly of the extension or release and the preservation of recourse,
the obligee can prevent this type of loss.
Id.
310. See zd. § 38 illus. 2.
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sets forth rules that allocate the burden of persuasion and dis-
cusses the attendant risk of nonpersuasion with respect to de-
fenses arising from an obligee's. impairment, or alleged impair-
ment, of a secondary obligor's rights of recourse.3 " The section
provides a discrete rule with respect to the burden of persuading
a fact finder that the act causing impairment occurred 1' and a
discrete set of rules about the burden of proving the amount of
loss flowing from the impairment. 13
First, under section 49(1), the secondary obligor has "the bur-
den of persuasion with respect to occurrence of the act constitut-
ing the impairment."1 4 The secondary obligor must persuade
the fact finder that the obligee performed the act causing im-
pairment, which is always the rule no matter which type of im-
pairment is alleged. 15 Second, the allocation of the burden of
persuasion as to the extent of the harm caused by the obligee's
act is dependent upon two factors: (1) the nature of the second-
ary obligor and (2) the nature of the act causing impairment."6
The rules for allocating the burden of persuasion on the issue
of loss or prejudice are contained in section 49(2):
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the burden of per-
suasion with respect to loss or prejudice caused by an
obligee's act unpairmng the secondary obligor's recourse
against the principal obligor is allocated as follows:
(a) the burden of persuasion is on the secondary obligor
if:
(i) the secondary obligor is in the business of entering
into secondary obligations, received a business benefit for
entering into the secondary obligation, or otherwise was in-
duced to enter into the secondary obligation by separate con-
sideration that directly benefits the secondary obligor; or
(ii) the act impairmng recourse is a modification of the
311. Id. § 49.
312. Id. § 49(1).
313. Id. § 49(2)-(3).
314. Id. § 49(1).
315. Id. § 49 cmt. a ("The burden of persuasion as to the occurrence of the act
impairng suretyship status is always on the secondary obligor.").
316. Id. ("If the act is an impairment of the secondary obligor's recourse, allocation
of the burden of persuasion as to the harm resulting from that act depends on the
nature of the secondary obligor and of the act.").
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underlying obligation, unless the secondary obligor establish-
es that the modification is material 317
One must inquire as to where a nonconsensual surety fits into
this scheme for allocating burdens. Neither the comments nor
the illustrations specifically address the link between section
49(2) and nonconsensual sureties. A nonconsensual surety who
attains that status through a delegation of duties under an Arti-
cle 2 contract, however, will nearly always have received a busi-
ness benefit in connection with the delegation. A buyer delegat-
ing the obligation to pay for goods often will receive a benefit
from the delegate, namely, a comnnssion for arranging the sale.
Another example is a franchisee who delegates a duty to take
and pay for goods in connection with the sale of a franchise. The
franchisee will receive consideration for the sale of rights under
the franchise, usually coupled with the sale of other assets. A
reading of cases reported under UCC section 2-210 does not
disclose delegations that occur other than from apparent busi-
ness benefits, although the benefit sometimes is merely shed-
ding an obligation no longer wanted in a particular business
context."' Nonconsensual sureties who attain that status un-
der section 2-210 thus logically should generally bear the burden
of persuasion pursuant to section 49(2)(a)(i).319 Of course, un-
der section 49(2)(a)(ii), all secondary obligors bear the burden of
persuasion as to loss due to a minor, less-than-material modifi-
cation unlikely to cause any loss in the normal course, an alloca-
tion which seems eminently fair.2 °
317. Id. § 49(2)(a).
318. For a discussion of the delegation cases, see supra part IV
319. This assertion does not imply that any other interpretation is illogical. Be-
cause nonconsensual sureties are not specifically covered in § 49, a court might find
applicable rules elsewhere in the law or fashion rules pertaining particularly to
nonconsensual sureties.
320. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 49(2)(a)(ii).
When the discharging event is a modification of the underlying obligation
that is not material, and, therefore, quite unlikely to cause loss, it would
be unfair to put the obligee in the position of proving a negative-i.e.,
the lack of loss. Accordingly, m all cases, the burden of persuasion as to
loss caused by a modification to the secondary obligation that is not
material is on the secondary obligor.
Id. § 49 cmt. c.
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Finally, section 49(3) contains what can be justly described as
an equitable rule designed for cases that are too complex to be
determined under the rules contained in subsection 2.21 Sup-
pose a secondary obligor persuades the fact finder that the obli-
gee committed an act causing impairment of the right of re-
course and further proves monetary loss flowing from the
obligee's act but, due to inherent complexities of the case, cannot
quantify any loss. Lest the harm attributable to the obligee's act
go unremedied because of proof problems, subsection 3 creates a
presumption that the impairment is equal to the secondary
obligor's liability and shifts the burden of persuasion as to any
lesser amount to the obligee. 2 Subsection 3 thus allows judi-
cial discretion in determining whether "the amount of loss is not
reasonably susceptible of calculation or requires proof of facts
that are not ascertainable."3' A nonconsensual surety should
have the benefit of this subsection, as would any other second-
ary obligor in appropriately ambiguous fact situations.
C. Nonconsensual Suretyship and the Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship's Rules for Discharge of the Secondary Obligor
1. Section 39: Release
Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship has re-
placed section 122 of the 1941 Restatement of Security 32 4 Sec-
tion 39 is more complex than was section 122 of the old Restate-
ment. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to extract
321. The rule states:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(a), if-
(a) the secondary obligor demonstrates prejudice caused by the
impairment of recourse and
(b) the circumstances of the case indicate that the amount of loss is
not reasonably susceptible of calculation or requires proof of facts that
are not ascertainable,
it is presumed that the act impairing recourse caused a loss or impair-
ment equal to the secondary obligor's liability pursuant to the secondary
obligation, and the burden of persuasion as to any lesser amount of such
loss is on the obligee.
Id. § 49(3).
322. See id. § 49 cmt. d.
323. Id. § 49(3)(b).
324. See id. § 39 reporter's note.
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two main principles from paragraphs b and c of section 39,
which state:
To the extent that the obligee releases the principal obligor
from its duties pursuant to the underlying obligation:
(b) the secondary obligor is discharged from any unper-
formed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation unless:
(i) the terms of the release effect a preservation of the
secondary obligor's recourse (§ 38); or
(ii) the language or circumstances of the release other-
wise show the obligee's intent to retain its claim against the
secondary obligor;
(c) if the secondary obligor is not discharged from its un-
performed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation by
operation of paragraph (b), the secondary obligor is dis-
charged from those duties to the extent:
(i) of the value of the consideration for the release;
(ii) that the release of a duty to pay money pursuant to
the underlying obligation would otherwise cause the second-
ary obligor a loss; and
(iii) that the release discharges a duty of the principal
obligor other than the payment of money 35
An important principle to grasp from paragraph b is that a
secondary obligor is not discharged automatically by a creditor's
release of a principal obligor, even in the absence of an express
preservation of rights, if the language or circumstances of the
release show the obligee's intent to retain a claim against the
secondary obligor.326 An obligee, therefore, quite possibly may
release a principal obligor and yet retain a claim or part of a
claim against a secondary obligor without an explicit preserva-
tion of rights."7 A second fundamental principle underlies sub-
section c of section 39, namely, that a secondary obligor against
whom an obligee retains rights while releasing a principal may
nonetheless have a claim for partial discharge measured accord-
ing to the standards established in subsections (c)(i) through
325. Id. § 39.
326. See td.
327. "Preservation of nghts" has been substituted for the term "reservation of
rights." See id. § 38.
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(c)(iii). A third principle, embedded in subsection (c)(iii), dis-
charges a secondary obligor to the extent that an obligee dis-
charges the principal obligor from any obligation other than
payment of money
Illustrations 5 and 6 following section 39 are helpful in ex-
plaimng paragraphs b and c. Illustration 5 states:
D buys a computer system from C on credit for $10,000. G
guarantees D's obligation to pay the remainder of the pur-
chase price. Later, when the unpaid balance is $7,000, D
stops paying, claiming that the system is not merchantable
as warranted. C demes D's allegation. After negotiation, C
and D agree that D will pay $5,000 of the unpaid balance of
$7,000 and that C and D will release each other from further
liability with respect to the transaction. The release of D
discharges G from its duties pursuant to the guaranty "
Manifest in this illustration is a compromise when the rights
of the parties were unclear. Under UCC Article 2, D would have
an array of remedial rights if C breached a warranty 29 In con-
trast, if C could prove that D was wrong and that no warranty
had been breached, C would have a claim for the full price of the
accepted goods.3  The negotiated $5000 settlement on C's
$7000 clani has the appearance of an accord and satisfaction;
hence, leaving a claim over against G would run contrary to
common sense. C's release of D releases G because neither the
language of the release nor the circumstances indicate other-
wise, nor was there an express preservation of rights.
By a slight spin of the facts, illustration 6 makes a good resid-
ual claim against G"
D buys a computer system from C on credit for $10,000. G
guarantees D's obligation to pay the remainder of the pur-
chase price. Later, when the unpaid balance is $7,000, D,
who is insolvent, stops paying. Investigation reveals that D's
only asset is $5,000 m cash that D had realized by selling the
computer system. Realizing that any judgment against D
328. Id. § 39 illus. 5.
329. For the catalog of a buyer's remedies, see U.C.C. § 2-711 (1994). For the
buyer's right of set-off m the event of breach, see id. § 2-717.
330. See id. § 2-709.
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would be difficult to collect, C agrees to release D from the
obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price m ex-
change for the $5,000. The circumstances indicate that C in-
tended to retain its claim against G. G is not discharged
pursuant to paragraph (b), but is discharged to the extent
provided in paragraph (c).331
The fact that D stopped payment because of insolvency rather
than due to any complaint about the computer system is impor-
tant. As a matter of business judgment, therefore, C took $5000
and released D from any further obligation. This situation does
not have the appearance of an accord and satisfaction. From the
"situation sense,"332 we know that C did not intend to dis-
charge G by the compromise with D, especially because a funda-
mental purpose of having a guarantor is to guard against the
principal's insolvency Nevertheless, the payment of $5000
should diminish G's obligation, lest C be overcompensated. Ac-
cordingly, under paragraph (c)(i), G's obligation is reduced: "the
secondary obligor is discharged to the extent: (i) of the value
of the consideration for the release."333 G is consequently dis-
charged to the extent of $5000 and is liable only for the deficien-
cy If the consideration for the release had been $1000, G would
have been discharged to that extent and would have remained
331. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 39 illus. 6.
332. "Situation sense" refers to Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential realism. See KARL
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 59-61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960). Llewellyn
best indicated the meaning of the term when he stated:
Situation-Sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts in their
context and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working
result, coupled with whatever the judge or court brings and adds to the
evidence, in the way of knowledge and experience and values to see with,
and to judge with.
Id. at 60.
Thus, for Llewellyn, "situation sense" was a judicial virtue combining an ability
(1) to see that the facts of a case belong to a type and (2) to discern the practical
result toward which the fact-type tends to push. For example, in the illustration
quoted in the text, the fact-type is that of an insolvent principal from whom the
creditor needs to extract whatever settlement he can manage. This fact-type should
push the discerning judge to recognize that complete release is inappropriate because
it would undercut the creditor's legitimate expectation of satisfaction from the guar-
antor. See also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
216-27 (1973) (discussing at length the term "situation sense" as used by Llewellyn).
333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GuAR. § 39(c)(i).
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liable for the $6000 deficiency 34
If, however, C agreed to release a solvent D from any further
obligation to pay the $7000 in order to settle an unrelated dis-
pute, this release would have discharged G totally33 Tns re-
sult makes perfect sense; there is no reason why a claim against
a secondary obligor should survive when a solvent principal obli-
gor cuts a deal on an unrelated matter and gains a release.
Section 39 of the Restatement of Suretyship thus contains ves-
tiges of stnctssimi jurts,336 but this old doctrine, so antagoms-
tic to obligees, has been tamed; G's release and the extent there-
of are governed more by the parties' reasonable expectations
surrounding the institution of suretyship than by an unyielding
formalism under which any release resulted in total discharge of
a secondary obligor in the absence of consent or a reservation of
rights. In a sense, section 39337 strikes a hard blow against di-
chotomous reasomng: instead of asking simply whether a sec-
ondary obligor is liable, a court often must determine the sec-
ondary obligor's liability on a spectrum between zero and one
hundred percent.33 The answer will require fact-finding, with
particular attention to the burden of persuasion as allocated in
section 49.339
For example, harking back to the case of McKinnze v.
Milford3 40 and its spin-off, discussed in Part IV, recall that the
obligee (Milford) released the buyer-principal obligor (McKinme)
from liability for an assumed monetary obligation arising from
his seller's breach of contract. Under section 122 of the Restate-
ment of Security, the obligee thereby unwittingly released the
334. This result assumes that G would not have been able to recover anything
more than the settlement amount under its right of recourse. See id. § 39 illus. 7.
For the burden of proof on the amount of the loss, see td. § 39 cmt. f; see also 1d. §
49 (discussing the burden of persuasion).
335. Id. § 39 illus. 9.
336. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing strictissiml jurts).
337. The discussion of § 39 includes the sections that follow it.
338. See Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 897,
903-09 (1995). As Professor Nyquist has demonstrated, transferees inside and outside
of the Code take rights by degrees; similarly, under the Restatement of Suretyship,
delegators can be exculpated gradually based on postdelegation conduct.
339. See, e.g., id at 907 (detailing how to allocate and determine the burden of per-
suasion using a spectrum theory of negotiation). In addition, see supra part V.B.3.
340. 597 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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seller-secondary obligor (Stewart). If section 39 of the Restate-
ment of Suretyship applied instead, the release probably would
be considered partial because the circumstances tend to show
Milford's intent to keep his claim against the original obligor.
Under section 39(c)(i), however, Stewart, as secondary obligor,
could claim a partial discharge to the extent of the consideration
McKinme paid for his release. Stewart would remain liable
beyond that sum unless he could prove a loss as a result of the
release, as allowed by section 39(c)(ii). 4 ' It should be noted
that, if Milford released McKinme from an obligation other than
the payment of money, Stewart, as a secondary obligor, would be
completely released as to that obligation under section 39(c)(iii).
2. Sectin 40: Time Extensions
As with section 39 of the Restatement of Suretyship, there are
many complexities in section 40 that are beyond the scope of
this Article. The main points are found in paragraphs a and b,
which, in combination with the introductory language, read as
follows:
If the obligee grants the principal obligor an extension of
the time for performance of its duties pursuant to the under-
lying obligation:
(a) the extension also extends the time for performance of
any corresponding duties of performance and reimbursement
owed by the principal obligor to the secondary obligor, unless
the extension effects a preservation of the secondary obligor's
recourse (§ 38);
(b) to the extent that the secondary obligor has not per-
formed its duties pursuant to the secondary obligation, it is
discharged from those duties to the extent that the extension
would otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss 342
341. Assigning the burden of persuasion to Stewart (secondary obligor) under Re-
statement of Suretyship § 49(2)(a)(i) assumes that a nonconsensual surety can be
considered a "professional" who has attained the status of secondary obligor m a
business transaction. Section 49, however, probably was not written specifically with
nonconsensual sureties in mind. A court might, therefore, place the burden of per-
suasion on the obligee, who would be required to prove loss less than the amount of
the total obligation to negate discharge. See supra part V.B.3.
342. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 40(a)-(b) (1995).
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As under section 39, partial discharge plays a major role in
the correct application of section 40 to suretyship problems.
Illustrations 5 and 6 are helpful. Illustration 5 states:
D borrows $10,000 from C, payable on July 12. S agrees
with C that, if D does not repay the loan on its due date, S
will repay the loan. On July 11, C grants D, who is solvent,
an extension of the due date of the loan to October 31. On
July 12, S, who is unaware of the extension, repays the loan
and seeks reimbursement from D. Because the extension also
extends the corresponding tme for D's duties of performance
and reimbursement, however, S is unable to proceed against
D until October 31, at which time D is insolvent. As a result,
only $3,000 is recovered from D. S would have been dis-
charged to the extent of the $7,000 loss. Because S repaid the
loan without knowledge of the extension, S has a claim
against C for the amount of that loss.'
The justification for the secondary obligor's claim against the
obligee is that the unconsented-to delay hurt the secondary
obligor by diminishing his reimbursement from the principal
obligor from $10,000 to $3000. If the value of recourse had been
dinnished to zero, S's just claim would have been for $10,000
because the extension harmed him to that extent. Likewise, if S
had delayed payment knowing of C's extension to D, and D had
become insolvent during the delay so that S's right of recourse
had no value, S would have been discharged in toto.34 It fol-
lows that, if the right of recourse yielded $5000 after a six-
month extension and would have been worth the full $10,000
before the extension, the discharge would be in the amount of
$5000. The extent of discharge due to an unconsented-to exten-
sion of time equals the economic harm to the surety resulting
from the time extension. 5
The reporter's note to section 40 states that this section fol-
343. Id. § 40 illus. 5 (citing § 37(4)).
344. Id § 40 illus. 6.
345. The comments to § 40 state: "If the extension granted to the principal obligor
would cause a secondary obligor that performed the secondary obligation a loss with
respect to its ability to obtain recovery through reimbursement, restitution, or subro-
gation, the secondary obligor is discharged to the extent of that loss." Id. § 40 cmt. f.
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lows UCC section 3-605(c) and replaces Restatement of Security
section 129. One should note, however, that the language of
section 40, paragraph a, pertains to extensions of time for the
performance of any obligation secured by a secondary obligor,
while section 129 and UCC section 3-605(c) by their terms per-
tain only to time extensions of monetary payment schedules.346
Moreover, pursuant to section 49 of the Restatement of
Suretyship, unless the surety becomes such for a business pur-
pose or for consideration or is in the business of entering into
secondary obligations, a presumption arises that his loss or
impairment equals his liability and the burden of negating the
loss or proving its lesser amount will be on the obligee. 7
Consider again Tennell v. Esteve3 4' and its spin-off, discussed
in Part IV While the time extension for payment, without the
consent of the surety or a reservation of rights by the creditor,
discharged Gant Cooley as secondary obligor (delegating party)
under section 129 of the old Restatement of Security, under sec-
tion 40 of the Restatement of Suretyship, any discharge of the
secondary obligor would have to correspond to his economic loss.
If the burden of persuasion were allocated to Gant Cooley (sec-
ondary obligor) because he had attained his suretyship status in
a business transaction pursuant to section 49(2)(a)(i), he would
need to prove that the loss incurred due to the time extension. If
the burden of persuasion were allocated to the obligee under
section 49(2)(b), a presumption of a loss equal to the secondary
obligor's remaining debt burden would arise. In that case, to re-
but the presumption, Tennell (obligee) would be required to
show the nonexistence or lesser amount of harm caused by the
extension. Either way, there would be fact-finding rather than
automatic discharge following proof of the time extension. 9
346. Compare id. § 40(a) (applying equally to any secured obligation) with RESTATE-
MENT OF SEC. § 129 (1941) (applying only to extensions of time for payment) and
U.C.C. § 3-605(c) (1994) (same).
347. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 49(2)(b).
348. 546 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
349. In the Author's view, Gant Cooley, as secondary obligor, should have the bur-
den of persuasion because he gained the privileges of suretyship in a business
transaction.
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3. Sectin 41. Modificatins (Apart from Time Extensins)
The reporter's note indicates that section 41 is based on UCC
section 3-605(d) and is intended to replace section 128 of the Re-
statement of Security 3" Generally, partial discharge equal to
the prejudice suffered underlies section 41. For purposes of this
Article, the main points are in paragraphs a and b, which, in
combination with the introductory language, state:
If the principal obligor and the obligee agree to a modifica-
tion, other than an extension of time or a complete or partial
release, of the principal obligor's duties pursuant to the un-
derlying obligation:
(a) any duty of the principal obligor to the secondary obli-
gor of performance or reimbursement is correspondingly
modified;
(b) the secondary obligor is discharged from any unper-
formed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation:
(i) if the modification creates a substituted contract or
imposes risks on the secondary obligor fundamentally differ-
ent from those imposed pursuant to the transaction prior to
modification;
(ii) in other cases, to the extent that the modification
would otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss 351
Illustration 2 following section 41 demonstrates how partial
discharge can occur:
B agrees to construct a building for 0 in accordance with
specifications contained in the contract. S issues a perfor-
mance bond to 0 with respect to this contract. Later, 0 and
B agree to a modification of the contract pursuant to which a
different, more complicated climate control system is to be in-
stalled in the building without additional compensation to B.
Later, B, who is insolvent, defaults on the contract, and S is
called upon to complete construction. S is discharged to the
extent that the modified climate control system adds to the
costs of S not recoverable from B by S.11
2
350. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 41 reporter's note.
351. Id. § 41(a)-(b).
352. Id. § 41 illus. 2.
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According to illustration 2, the extra cost, to the extent not
recoverable under the surety's right of recourse, is the measure
of the discharge. The surety otherwise remains liable to the
owner (obligee). The possibility of complete discharge is dis-
played in illustration 4: if B and 0 changed the contract from
construction of an office building for $1.5 million to a factory for
$2 million, the change would be "so fundamental as to amount
to a substituted contract."53 The secondary obligor therefore
would be discharged completely Anything short of a fundamen-
tal change, however, yields only a discharge pro tanto. Questions
about the burden of persuasion arsing under section 49, dis-
cussed previously with respect to section 40, can arse here al-
so."" Of course, there can be no preservation of rights under
section 41."'
Most important, for the purpose of this Article, is the sweep-
ing change from stnctissimi juris as it was incorporated into
section 128 of the 1941 Restatement. 56 Under the old regime,
except for compensated sureties,357 any unconsented-to change
other than a time extension for payment resulted in complete
discharge of the uncompensated surety The reservation-of-rights
device did not apply to modifications other than time extensions.
Under section 41 of the Restatement of Suretyship, anything
short of a substituted contract or its functional equivalent yields
only discharge proportionate to the harm caused by the
change. 8' Economic estimates of actual harm thus replace the
rigid rules of the 1941 Restatement.
Revisiting Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co.,359 discussed with its
spin-off in Part IV to illustrate principles of suretyship, the de-
sign change, which did not necessarily benefit the surety, result-
353. Id. § 41 illus. 4.
354. See id. § 49(2)(a)-(b) cmts. b-c. Whether a nonconsensual surety can be classi-
fied as a "professional" under § 49(2)(a)(i) is questionable, but the Author believes
that, in most fact situations, the answer will be affinmative.
355. Id. § 41 cmt. c.
356. See RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128 (1941).
357. The compensation a surety charges for executing surety contracts is called the
"premium." See supra note 99.
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 41.
359. 430 F Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affd, 574 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978).
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ed in a complete discharge under section 128 of the Restatement
of Security If section 41 applied, it is difficult to discern how
any loss could be claimed on account of the change in design.
The design change was not so fundamental as to create a substi-
tuted contract. The change also did not cause a loss cogmzable
under section 41(b)(ii) because the change did not generate any
discernible increase in the difference between the cost to per-
form the secondary obligation and the amount recoverable by
the secondary obligor (MonArk) under its recourse rights. There-
fore, the change wrought by the Restatement in section 41
would, on these facts, be radical-a change from total discharge
to no discharge in the case of a minimal design change not
agreed to by the secondary obligor.36
D. Summary
With respect to three special suretyship defenses, namely, (1)
release of a principal obligor, (2) time extensions, and (3) other
modifications, this Article has reviewed the changes in the law
from the 1941 Restatement of Security to the Restatement of
Suretyship. The focal point of the inquiry has been the way in
which these defenses can be used by nonconsensual sureties in
sales-of-goods cases. By considering typical commercial situa-
tions, the Article has demonstrated that the Restatement of
Suretyship has changed the law significantly The law has
changed from the days of stnctisszmz juris, in which a surety
was discharged automatically and completely by the creditor's
release of the principal or by a time extension not agreed upon
by the surety (assuming no reservation of rights) or by any other
modification of a sort that would not necessarily benefit the
surety The new Restatement allows far less frequent and often
only partial discharge. Additionally, its rules are more in accor-
dance with the reasonable expectations of the parties. The em-
360. Some of the old decisions implementing the rules contained m § 128, or its
common-law antecedents, seemed mindless. Professor Cohen noted this when he
stated, in the reporter's note following § 41: "The traditional rule was often applied
in a mechanical, almost mindless way, often resulting in discharge of the secondary
obligor even when the modification could only result in a benefit to the secondary
obligor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 41 reporter's note.
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phasis has shifted from rigid rules to the economic realities of
concrete situations. A surety under the new regime is treated
less tenderly than he would have been under the old regime.
Further, the less tender treatment pertains to nonconsensual
sureties as well as sureties who intentionally assume the bur-
dens and benefits of suretyship status. In jurisprudential jargon,
the new Restatement may be regarded as a delayed victory of
realism over formalism in American legal thinking.
VI. THREE HYPOTHETICALS: COMPARING RESULTS UNDER THE
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY AND THE RESTATEMENT OF
SURETYSHIP
Having investigated some basic changes the new Restatement
of Suretyship3 . has made in suretyship law, this Article will
now examine how these new standards require a different style
of lawyering and judicial decisionmaking than was required
under the Restatement of Security Often, the two different
regimes reach opposite results. Even when the results are the
same, however, the pathway to the results is different. In seek-
ing to demonstrate the truth of these claims, this Article will use
three hypothetical situations, each of which could arise easily
under a delegation governed by section 2-210 of the UCC.
A. Situation 1. The Carnwal Ride
Assume that manufacturer A made a contract to construct and
deliver to its customer, Fun City, within one year of the contract
date, an exotic carnival ride for an agreed price of $1 million, to
be paid in installments before the delivery date.62 The pro-
posed ride, designed by Fun City, was an imaginary rocket
launch. Before fabrication commenced, manufacturer A's officers,
for business reasons, decided to assign the Fun City contract, in-
cluding all benefits and burdens, to manufacturer B.3"' Manu-
facturer B agreed to perform the obligations under the contract
361. The Author wants to emphasize that §§ 37-49 are enriched with notes, com-
ments, and illustrations that contain many nuances not covered m this Article.
362. This situation would be covered by Article 2, even though the goods are spe-
cially manufactured. See U.C.C. §§ 2-102, -105(1) (1994).
363. The "assignment" therefore included a delegation of duties. Id. § 2-210(4).
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in return for direct payment by Fun City of the stipulated price
of $1 million-delivery and payment to proceed according to the
original contract schedule. A notified Fun City of its agreement
with B. Fun City neither protested nor agreed to release A,
hence, there was no novation.
Soon after B had started construction, Fun City's agents pro-
posed a design change: a modification to enhance the thrill by
increasing the speed preceding the launch. As a trade-off, the
rider capacity was to be reduced slightly B's engineers discerned
neither technical problems nor greater expense, therefore, the
modification was agreed to without extra charge."' Work pro-
ceeded as planned, and nobody mentioned the design change to
A. Fun City sent periodic payments to B. As the work neared
fifty percent completion, B suffered unexpected financial prob-
lems, became insolvent, and ceased production. As a result of
these setbacks, B failed to deliver. Because the failure to deliver
coincided with the commencement of Fun City's main carnival
season, it lost substantial revenues until it effectively covered
with a substitute purchase from manufacturer C for $1.5 mil-
lion. Although notified of the default, A had made no efforts to
cure it. Regrettably, by the time the cover was made in perfect
good faith, the main season was over.
Fun City sued A and B for direct, incidental, and consequen-
tial damages amounting to $2 million. Quaere: (1) Is A liable for
B's default?; (2) If the design change is discovered, does A have a
solid defense on the facts presented? Consider these questions in
light of suretyship principles." 5 Under section 128 of the Re-
statement of Security, the answer is predictable and reasonably
certain. Any modification agreed to by the principal and the
creditor (obligee) without the surety's consent means the surety
(other than a compensated surety) "is discharged unless the
modification is of a sort that can only be beneficial to the sure-
ty))3. Nothing in a design change by its nature makes the
change beneficial to the surety Under section 128, therefore,
364. This situation is allowed under Ld. § 2-209(1).
365. The proper designation of the parties in suretyship terms is simple. B was the
principal obligor, A, by its delegation, became a surety or secondary obligor, and Fun
City was the creditor or obligee.
366. RESTATEMENT OF SEC. § 128(a) (1941).
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discharge should follow proof of the modification without further
fact-finding as to its economic impact. Section 128 easily could
lead to disposition by summary judgment.
Under section 41 of the Restatement of Suretyship, however,
furnishing a legal opinion about A's liability or making a deci-
sion on the question becomes a more complex endeavor. Under
section 41(b)(i), the secondary obligor (surety) is discharged in
toto "if the modification creates a substituted contract or imposes
risks on the secondary obligor fundamentally different from
those imposed pursuant to the transaction prior to modifica-
tion.""6 7 On the stated facts, was the modification such as to
create a substituted contract? Did the change impose on the
secondary obligor (surety) a fundamentally different risk? The
answer to both questions is "no." Nevertheless, because the de-
sign change was more than aesthetic, a judge might discern a
factual issue respecting the impact of the change on production
scheduling and costs, as these factors would be relevant to
whether the change brought about a fundamentally different
risk. Under section 41, summary judgment for a surety thus is
less likely than under section 128, except in cases of the most
minimal changes.
If there were no discharge under section 41(b)(i), subsection
(b)(ii) allows discharge "to the extent that the modification
would otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss. "368 If proof
of increased engineering difficulty and increased costs to the
principal manufacturer (B) attributable to the modification could
be mustered, it could tend to show a reduction in B's assets
available for reimbursement to A. As a result, A would have an
argument for partial discharge. 69 Moreover, in this situation,
the burden of persuasion depends on whether the modification is
material."' The burden of persuasion as to amount of loss is on
367. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GuAR. § 41(b)(i) (1995).
368. Id. § 41(b)(ii).
369. The reporter's note following § 41 is illuminating: "This Restatement applies
the same rule to all secondary obligors, whether compensated or not, adopting the
more modem policy generally followed by the Uniform Commercial Code of discharg-
ing the secondary obligor only to the extent it would otherwise suffer loss as a re-
sult of the modification." Id. § 41 reporter's note.
370. See id. § 49(2)(a)(ii).
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the secondary obligor unless it proves that the modification was
material."' Therefore, there ight be a factual issue to be de-
cided in order to allocate the burden of proof properly Section
41 can be expected, therefore, to drive parties toward compro-
mse and settlement.
B. Situatwn 2: Two Farmers
Suppose farmer Olson owned 320 acres of land upon which he
intended to plant corn. In preparation for the season, he ordered
fertilizer to be applied at the time of planting and again during
the growing season. The seller agreed to sell Olson the fertilizer
on credit. The total debt of $32,000 was to be paid by year's end,
which was about two months after harvest time. Before plant-
ing, Olson suffered a mild heart attack; therefore, he leased the
320 acres to farmer Flannery, who paid a fair consideration,
including an assumption of the fertilizer order and the obligation
to pay for it. Olson notified the fertilizer supplier that Flannery
had taken over the farming operation as well as the fertilizer
debt. The supplier took note but neither agreed to release Olson
nor complained about Flannery assuming the obligation.
That year, a severe drought lowered the corn yield. Flannery
requested a time extension for payment on the fertilizer debt.
Without Olson's knowledge or consent, the supplier agreed to a
year's extension at prevailing interest rates without an express
reservation of rights. Subsequently, due to falling corn prices
and excessive debt, Flannery was unable to repay the $32,000
debt for fertilizer. Quaere: (1) Is Olson liable?; (2) If Olson un-
covers the terms of the time extension, is this a solid de-
fense?372 Under section 129(1) of the Restatement of Securi-
ty,73 the binding agreement to extend the principal obligor's
time for payment constitutes grounds for complete discharge of
Olson in his capacity as nonconsensual surety Establishing the
371. Id.
372. In suretyship terms, Flannery became a principal obligor, Olson became a
surety or secondary obligor, and the fertilizer supplier became a creditor or obligee.
373. "[Wihere the principal and creditor, without the surety's consent, make a bind-
mg agreement to extend the time of payment by the principal, the surety is dis-
charged unless the creditor in the extension agreement reserves his rights against
the surety." RESTATEMNT OF SEC. § 129(l) (1941).
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fact of the binding extension agreement is sufficient for dis-
charge without inquiry into whether harm was caused by the
extension. 74
Under section 40(b) of the Restatement of Suretyship, any
discharge on account of the time extension would only be "to the
extent that the extension would otherwise cause the secondary
obligor a loss." 75 Proving loss could be very difficult for the
secondary obligor, Olson. In light of this difficulty, the burden of
persuasion could be shifted under section 49(3). If the facts
showed that farmer Flannery's financial situation was as bad at
the time of the original due date as it proved to be later, then
the supplier-obligee would have negated any claim of loss result-
ing from the extension. The obligee, however, might fall short of
proving an equally bad financial situation on both due dates;
rather, the evidence might show a steady deterioration of
Flannery's financial situation, as suggested in the hypothetical.
Unless the facts are clear, a triable issue will arise, precluding
summary judgment. In the foregoing situation, complete dis-
charge will be much less likely than if the 1941 Restatement
were used as a source of authority It was Olson, however, who
ordered the fertilizer from which he derived a benefit in the
form of rental payments either in crops or cash. Section 40
seems fair.
C. Situatzon 3: Two Fishermen
Suppose Fran, a commercial fisherman, entered into a con-
tract by the terms of which she agreed to sell her catfish catch
to a restaurant for one season. Fran usually sold approximately
one hundred pounds of catfish per day, and the restaurant sold
about that much during good times. The supply contract proved
mutually beneficial and was continued year to year. One year,
in mid-season, Fran's old friend, Anna, arrived unexpectedly
and asked her to go sailing. She promptly agreed, assigmng
her contract for supplying catfish to Sammy, who thereby as-
sumed the obligation to supply his daily catfish catch to the
374. Olson would not be a compensated surety under the Restatement of Security.
See td. § 129(2).
375. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 40(b).
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restaurant in return for payment of the price at which Fran
had been compensated."'
Sammy was inexperienced, had poor equipment, and had even
poorer judgment. Consequently, his catch was smaller than
Fran's had been and his income less. After thirty days, Sammy
became discouraged and quit fishing, leaving the restaurant
without a steady catfish supply The impact on the restaurant
was devastating. Catfish from other suppliers cost double the
price the restaurant had been paying Fran and Sammy, and it
could not acquire enough to meet demand. The restaurant's
reputation suffered, customers drifted off, and, consequently,
income diminished significantly-all for want of its culinary
mainstay, fried catfish.
Upon Fran's return, the restaurant's owner sought a settle-
ment with Fran. Fran, however, refused to bargain because she
felt no obligation in relation to Sammy's poor performance. The
restaurant owner, therefore, sued both Fran and Sammy, seek-
ing to recoup losses estimated at $25,000. Being a man of very
modest means and little experience in business matters, Sammy
was frightened by the suit and offered $1000 for an immediate
release. Realizing that Sammy had few resources and no roots
in the community, plaintiff took the $1000 and gave Sammy a
complete written release, intending to continue the litigation
against Fran, who was in better financial condition and appar-
ently more attached to the community On learmng of the re-
lease, Fran filed a motion to dismiss. Quaere: (1) Is Fran liable
for Sammy's failure to supply the catfish?; (2) Does Fran have a
good defense on account of Sammy's release?377
If section 122 of the Restatement of Security applied, Fran
would be discharged because she neither agreed to remain liable
nor did the creditor reserve rights against her. 8 Under section
376. See supra part IV (discussing delegation as part of an assignment of a con-
tract); see also U.C.C. § 2-210(4) (1994) (stating that assignment of the "contract"
includes both an assignment of rights and a delegation of duties).
377. In suretyship terms, Sammy became the principal obligor, Fran became a
nonconsensual surety or secondary obligor, and the restaurant owner became a credi-
tor or obligee.
378. Section 122 states: "Where the creditor releases a principal, the surety is dis-
charged, unless (a) the surety consents to remain liable notwithstanding the release,
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39 of the Restatement of Suretyship, Fran's release is also like-
ly, but the correct analysis involves some subtleties. First, under
section 39(b)(ii), the "circumstances of the release show the
obligee's intent to retain its claim against the secondary obli-
gor."379 Hence, pursuant to section 39(b), release in toto should
not occur. Second, under section 39(c)(i), Fran would be released
to the extent of $1000, i.e., "the value of the consideration for
the release."8 ° Whether Fran would be released to a greater
extent under section 39(c)(ii) is questionable.3 8 ' Under section
39(c)(iii), however, Fran's case for complete discharge is very
strong. This is true because Fran's release of Sammy will most
likely be deemed a release that discharges a duty of the prnci-
pal obligor (Sammy) other than the payment of money, namely,
the obligation to supply fish. The results could be affected by the
allocation of the burden of persuasion under section 49(2) and
(3), but Fran's discharge is likely if her attorney carefully unrav-
els section 39 and uses it in her favor.
D. Summary
The foregoing hypotheticals illustrate the significance of the
new Restatement of Suretyship in situations involving contract
modification, time extension for payment, and release. Under
the Restatement of Security, the principle of strictissimi juris
usually resulted in discharge of the nonconsensual surety (sec-
ondary obligor) without any proof of harm.8 2 Strictisszmi jurzs
or (b) the creditor in the release reserves is rights against the surety." RESTATE-
MENT OF SEC. § 122.
379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 39(b)(ii).
380. Id. § 39(c)(i).
381. Subsection 39(c) states:
[I]f the secondary obligor is not discharged from its unperformed
duties pursuant to the secondary obligation by operation of paragraph (b),
the secondary obligor is discharged from those duties to the extent:
(ii) that the release of a duty to pay money pursuant to the underly-
ing obligation would otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss; and
(iii) that the release discharges a duty of the principal obligor other
than the payment of money;
Id. § 39(c)(ii)-(iii).
382. Obviously, there would be discharge for a voluntary surety under the same
sections, with exceptions for compensated sureties. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SEC.
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was applied with a total indifference to the economic realities
involved. Under the Restatement of Suretyship, the existence or
absence of economic harm is critical. Strictzssimz juris has lost
its power. In this Author's view, sections 37 through 49 of the
Restatement of Suretyship drive toward results that better agree
with the reasonable expectations of persons engaged in com-
merce than did the Restatement of Security
This new doctrinal system might be slightly more complex to
adnmster. The more sophisticated approach of the Restate-
ment of Suretyship sometimes will require more factual inquiry
than did its predecessor, maing cases more difficult to dispose
of by pre-tnal motions. This could increase litigation and its
attendant costs. If, however, the commercial players act ratio-
nally, the balance of risks and obligations built into the new
Restatement should be a factor that mduces reasonable settle-
ments. If settlements cannot be effected, the results of litiga-
tion also should be reflective of this balance, which is built into
the new Restatement. The new Restatement should be wel-
comed, not resisted, though it may be challenging to use at
first, as is the case with the operation of any complex and
innovative machinery
VII. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF BLENDING ARTICLE 2
DELEGATIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF NONCONSENSUAL SURETYSHIP
LAW
A. The Imperialistic Tendency of Article 2
In millions of common Article 2 transactions, neither delega-
tion nor nonconsensual suretyship will play any role. In consum-
er purchases, malkng a sale subject to a buyer's assumption of a
seller's outstanding liabilities to an upstream seller is virtually
unheard of. Common experience suggests that few commercial
buyers will buy goods assuming their sellers' payment obliga-
tions to upstream sellers.3" Moreover, delegations of obliga-
tions necessarily occur when obligations are executory, and there
§ 129(2).
383. The Author knows of no empmcal study respecting mcidents of debt as-
sumptions m Article 2 transactions.
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are no executory obligations" in simple exchanges of title to
goods for a price.385
Article 2 has an imperialistic tendency, however, as it tends to
conquer areas not recogmzed as being within its realm when the
Code was promulgated in the 1950s. Distribution agreements,
which, by their inherent nature, are relational rather than
transactional contracts, are one such area being subjected to the
31Code's dominion. 88 On occasion, distribution contracts are as-
signed and the duties thereunder are delegated, triggering the
application of section 2-210. A textbook example is Sally Beauty
Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., 37 in which the majority of the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the delegation of duties in a hair care
products distribution contract was unlawful under section 2-210.
Suretyship principles were not imported, but the case illustrates
an expansive trend of Article 2 jurisprudence that will lead
toward greater applicability of suretyship law
Best Barber & Beauty Supply Co. (Best) was engaged in the
business of distributing hair care products to barber shops,
beauty salons, and retails stores in Texas." Nexxus Products
Co. (Nexxus), a supplier of hair care products, negotiated an
agreement whereby Best became Nexxus's exclusive distributor
384. The one possible exception may be seller's warranties under U.C.C. §§ 2-312
to -315 (1994).
385. See id. § 2-106(i) (defining "sale" as 'the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price").
386. For examples of recent cases in which courts have either applied Article 2 to
adjudicate rights in distribution contracts or have found, by application of Article 2,
that there was no enforceable distribution contract, see Ralph's Distrib. Co. v. AMF,
Inc., 667 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying the UCC to a snowmobile distributor-
ship); Spierng v. Fairmont Foods Co., 424 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding a milk
distribution contract unenforceable under § 2-201); Pharo Distrib. Co. v. Stahl, 782
S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (applying the UCC to a beer distribution contract);
Leibel v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 571 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (applying the UCC
to a garage door distribution contract); United Beer Distrib. Co. v. Hiram Walker,
557 N.Y.S.2d 336 (App. Div. 1990) (holding a beer distribution agreement unenforce-
able under § 2-201); Computer Strategies, Inc. v. Commodore Business Machs., Inc.,
483 N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 1984) (applying the UCC to a microcomputer distribu-
torship); Quality Performance Lines v. Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah
1980) (applying the UCC to a brake shoe distribution agreement).
387. 801 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing many recent distribution cases
in which the courts found Article 2 applicable).
388. Id. at 1002.
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in most of Texas. 89 Sally Beauty Co. (Sally Beauty) purchased
Best,"' making Sally Beauty a distributor for Nexxus. Sally
Beauty assumed Best's obligations under its distribution agree-
ment with Nexxus"' Differently stated, Best delegated its ob-
ligations under the distribution agreement to Sally Beauty After
finding out about the delegation, Nexxus terminated the distrib-
utorship because Sally Beauty was a corporation wholly owned
by Alberto-Culver Co., a major Nexxus competitor."2
Sally Beauty sued, claiming breach by wrongful termina-
tion.393 Using the test from UCC section 2-210(1), that "[a]
party may perform Is duty through a delegate unless the
other party has a substantial interest in having his original
promisor perform or control the acts required by the con-
tract,"3" the court upheld a summary judgment for Nexxus,
who had terminated the contract.395 The majority concluded
that Nexxus had "a substantial interest in not seeing this con-
tract performed by Sally Beauty" 96 The dissent from Judge
Posner was stinging.397 Without going further into the merits,
it is sufficient to note that none of the judges doubted the appli-
cability of Article 2. Moreover, had the delegation been allowed,
Best (assuming its corporate continuity) would have been a
nonconsensual surety for Sally Beauty's performance in the
absence of a novation.
Sally Beauty Co. illustrates the modern context in which sec-
tion 2-210 likely will be invoked, namely, in the transfer of obli-
gations under a distribution contract. In this context, issues of
nonconsensual suretyship usually are latent. With ever-increas-
389. Id. at 1002-03.
390. Id. at 1001. The opinion does not state explicitly whether Best was acquired
through a stock purchase or a purchase of assets. Id.
391. Id. at 1003.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1006 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2-210(a) (Vernon 1968)).
395. Id. at 1008.
396. Id.
397. "My brethren have decided, with no better foundation than judicial intuition
about what businessmen consider reasonable, that the Uniform Commercial Code
gives a supplier an absolute right to cancel an exclusive-dealing contract if the deal-
er is acquired, directly or indirectly, by a competitor of the supplier." Id. (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
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ing trade freedom, no reason remains for believing that distribu-
tion contracts and assignments with attendant delegations will
diminish in frequency or economic importance. Consequently,
the knitting together of the law of delegation under section 2-
210 and principles of nonconsensual suretyship from the new
Restatement of Suretyship will be more important than ever
before, as businesses reshuffle, taking on or shedding distribu-
tion contracts. 98 Furthermore, the tendency of recent drafts
under discussion for the revision of Article 2 has been toward
expanded coverage rather than toward any constriction of
scope. 9
B. Delegatins Under Article 2: A Case for Inclusin of
Suretyship Principles
According to comment 1 to section 2-210: "Generally, this
section recognizes both delegation of performance and assign-
ability as normal and permissible incidents of a contract for the
sale of goods."" 0 In the recent drafts of the proposals for a re-
vised Article 2, delegation remains a normal and permissible
incident of a contract, although rules on delegation may be
398. Naturally, selling assets to a buyer who assumes seller's liabilities as part of
the price triggers suretyship principles, regardless of whether a distribution contract
is involved.
399. The March 1, 1996 draft states in relevant part:
(a) Unless the context otherwise reqires, this [Article] applies to
any:
(1) transaction, regardless of form, that creates a contract for the
sale of goods, including a contract in which a sale of goods predominates;
(2) claim that goods supplied under a contract in which the sale of
goods does not predominate fail to conform to the terms of the contract;
and
(3) term in a contract for sale or a collateral contract obligating
the seller to install, customize, service, repair, or replace the goods sold
at or after the time of delivery.
(b) If a transaction involves information and goods that are not
copies of the information or documentation pertaining to the information
this [Article] applies to the aspects of the transaction that involve the
goods and their performance and rights in the goods, but [Article] 2B
applies to the aspects of the transaction involving the information and
copies or documentation of the information.
U.C.C. § 2-103(a)-(b) (Tentative Draft Mar. 1, 1996).
400. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 1 (1994).
PRIVILEGES OF SURETYSHIP
moved into a new section 2-211 and assignment may be moved
elsewhere'O°
According to the proposed section 2-211.
A party may delegate to another its performance under a
contract for sale unless the other party to the contract has a
substantial interest in having the original promisor perform
or directly control the performance required by the contract
or the contract prohibits delegation. A delegation of perfor-
mance does not relieve the delegating party of any duty to
perform or liability for breach."m
While giving delegation its own section in revised Article 2
does not necessarily signal an elevation in importance, it is clear
that a liberal policy toward delegation will continue as the Code
is revised. Assuming an increasing frequency of delegations in
complex Article 2 transactions, the absence of any Code refer-
ence to the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship attained by
the delegating party is unfortunate. Whether it is the seller or
the buyer who delegates, the imposition of the privileges of sure-
tyship can be very important, as the foregoing pages have
sought to demonstrate. The privileges of nonconsensual surety-
ship can be decisive in litigation, and they can therefore have
substantial economic consequences for the creditors (original
nondelegating party), the sureties (delegating parties), and the
principal obligors (delegates).
In some ways, the Restatement of Suretyship represents a
significant reduction of the privileges of nonconsensual sure-
ties.40 ' This development makes sense for policy reasons. Sub-
stantively, the new Restatement melds well with Article 2. Dis-
charge by surprise is less likely to occur than under the 1941
Restatement. Moreover, the technical quality of the new Restate-
ment of Suretyship is very high. 4 It should be cited more fre-
quently than was its predecessor. Lawyers should be aware not
401. Under the March 1, 1996, draft, assignment will be treated in a new § 2-403.
U.C.C. § 2-403 (Tentative Draft Mar. 1, 1996).
402. Id. § 2-211.
403. The Restatement of Suretyship affects other noncompensated sureties as well.
404. The bench and bar undoubtedly owe a debt to the Reporter, Professor Neil
Cohen, for the speed with which the Restatement was prepared and for the quality
of the completed text.
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only of the intersection of delegation and suretyship law but also
of the changes wrought by the new Restatement. There seems to
be no justification for hiding the Restatement from lawyers
working with Article 2.
Consequently, at nnmmum, a cross-reference to suretyship
principles in the comments to a new section 2-211 would be most
helpful. Such a reference would not unduly pollute the Code.
Counsel would be alerted to the potential blending of section 2-
210 and suretyship principles on account of nonconsensual sure-
tyship status. Even more helpful would be a slight statutory
alteration at the end of the new section 2-211. Where the pro-
posed statute states that a delegation of performance "does not
relieve the delegating party of any duty to perform or liability
for breach,"4 5 it could go on to state: "but the delegating party
may have the privileges of nonconsensual suretyship." The com-
ments could then make appropriate references to section (2)(e) of
the Restatement of Suretyship and the related standards for
discharge. This change would go far to blend the law of surety-
ship and delegation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Professor D. Benjamin Beard stated with respect to sureties
created by operation of law-
[Alithough the obligee obtains additional security for the
performance of the principal obligation, its rights in dealing
with the principal obligor may be circumscribed in order for
it to retain its full rights against the secondary obligor. Be-
cause failure to recognize those transactions that implicate
suretyship principles may result m an obligee's losing the
security for the principal obligation represented by a second-
ary obligor, it is critical for an obligee and its counsel to be
able to recognize such transactions.4"
This Article is largely an elaboration of Professor Beard's
insights. It has gone somewhat farther into delegation cases
under Article 2 than did Professor Beard's article, in an attempt
405. Id.
406. Beard, supra note 43, at 1158-59.
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to give special attention to the application of suretyship prnci-
ples to delegations under section 2-210 of the Code. Additional-
ly, it has contained an emphasis on history to demonstrate the
significance of the transition from the 1941 Restatement of
Security to the new Restatement of Suretyship. With the pro-
mulgation and adoption of the new Restatement and the immi-
nent revision of Article 2, the blending of delegation under Arti-
cle 2 with the law of nonconsensual suretyship merits greater
recognition. Either the text of the revised Article 2 or its com-
ments should recogmze explicitly the privileges of nonconsensual
suretyship.
